Gl 



These are startling statements, and read like a confession of 

 a material atheism. But as the language is somewhat hazy, 

 and as Tyndall and Huxley seem indignant that they should 

 be charged with holding such a dogma, Heave them to explain 

 their own meaning, and to give to the world, if they so desire, 

 their scientific creed in intelhgible language. One thing, 

 however, is clear ; whatever view of the origin and nature of 

 the human mind the words are intended to convey, they do 

 not even attempt to establish it by scientific proof. No ob- 

 servation has ever yet reached, or can ever reach, to the 

 development of a fiery cloud into emotion, intellect, will, and 

 all the phenomena of the human mind. It is a daring 

 flight of imagination, and nothing more. Tyndall himself 

 seems to shrink from it in moments of thoughtfulness, when 

 imagination is restrained by judgment : — " What bafiles and 

 bewilders me, is the notion that from these physical tremors, 

 things so utterly incongruous with them as sensation, thought 

 and emotion can be derived. . . . You cannot satisfy the 

 human understanding in its demand for logical continuity 

 between molecular processes and the phenomena of conscious- 

 ness. This is the rock on which materialism must inevitabl}'- 

 split whenever it pretends to be a complete philosophy of life.''^* 

 Herbert Spencer is right in asserting that of the substance 

 of mind nothing is known, or can be known by Science. 

 The faculties of the mind lie outside the field of pure Science. 



This suggests another and most important point. It is by 

 the mind the scientist obtains his knowledge of nature ; all 

 his knowledge, in fact, must come through that channel. The 

 senses are only the material avenues through which the mind 

 apprehends physical phenomena. The senses observe, but to 

 their observations must be added primary beliefs or intuitions, 

 ere any intelligible interpretation, even of the simplest phe- 

 nomena, can be given. It is from intuition we derive our 

 knowledge of the reality of the external world and everything 

 in it ; for sensation is only the apprehension by the mind of 

 an impression made on the sensorium, and it is the mind itself 

 which intuitively forms the conception of the reality of the 

 object that made the impression. So, in like manner, from 

 intuition we get our knowledge of the properties of matter, 

 such as weight, extension, and force ; it is by intuition Ave 

 form comparisons ; and it is from intuition we obtain our 

 ideas of cause and effect. The senses, on whatever object 

 exercised, and though aided by the utmost experience of the 



* Address. 



