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that we have polluted the waters of our rivers to such an extent that the 

 salmon, becoming infested with entozoa and epizoa, have been made to suffer 

 through the folly of man ? We ought, therefore, to endeavour to act with 

 prudence and conscientiousness in regard to all such matters, and thus 

 bring to the lowest possible minimum these physical evils. If we, as 

 Christian pioneers, and missionaries, only succeed in making our people 

 cleanly, thoughtful, and sober-minded, we shall do much to minimise 

 physical as well as moral evil, and may bring about a better state of things 

 by co-operating with God in preparing for that grand and glorious time, 

 when evil shall be abolished, and truth and righteousness will be established 

 to the happiness and advantage of our country and of the whole world. 



Mr. W. Griffith. — One explanation of the difficulties is that, as there is a 

 moral Governor of the Universe, we must accept and admit the conclusion 

 that justice will be administered to all, and that, therefore, in the long run, 

 evil will not predominate. There is force in this proposition; but, 

 ii imori reasoning hardly satisfies the practical mind of the present day. We 

 look around us and witness an enormous amount of evil, and the problem we 

 have to solve is , how are we to explain and reconcile this, not on mere abstract 

 grounds, but on such as may convince the majority of our fellow-creatures ? 

 The author of the paper has quoted a very important passage from Leibnitz, 

 whose writings for some generations have largely influenced the philosophic 

 mind of Germany. We ought to feel greatly obliged to the author for 

 having brought forward many arguments which refute the minor propositions 

 of Schopenhauer, Von Hartmann, and other writers of that school of 

 pessimists which denies the existence of a moral supreme government. 

 But it is hardly necessary to use the a j^rioj'i argument as to the 

 existence of a moral Governor, in order to explain some of the evils that 

 exist. It can hardly be said that, because one order of beings possess 

 great powers of happiness and intellect and other faculties, it is, there- 

 fore, an evil that inferior animals, without such faculties, should exist. 

 Such animals may exist and enjoy life, and their happiness may be 

 great, not only in the individual, but the sum of happiness, in the whole, 

 may be very considerable. As a question of society we must expect in the 

 diflferent orders of beings that some must be superior to others, and, without 

 taking the a ]jriori argument, it is clear that, if we have in the universe a 

 society of men and animals, there must be some that are superior to 

 others. The metaphysical argument is advanced by Leibnitz in his 

 first position, but I think the truth establishes itself independently of meta- 

 physics. We must remember that man is at the head of creation, and it 

 is his duty to use the powers of intellect he possesses for the purposes 

 of civilisation. He does so use those powers, and, according to the way 

 in which they are exercised, evil may diminish, and the happiness 

 of his race be enlarged. If he does not exercise them, he is in fault. 

 But this is only on the ground that the powers given him for subduing 

 nature are not properly exercised ; the barbarism thereby produced being 



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