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judgmeut on the whole work of creation, the more conscious we become of 

 our total ignorance of the subject, and of our incapacity to form any 

 judgment at all, I remember having heard a very intelligent author 

 assert that bodily pain was one of the evils of this world. I, for one, was 

 rather startled by the suggestion. I had always thought that bodily 

 pain was a beneficent messenger from the part afflicted, intended to 

 give an intimation to the mind that something wrong was going on in 

 one's existence. As it is, the smallest departure from healthy existence 

 is attended by bodily pain, which necessarily attracts attention to the 

 part affected ; and it is our own fault if we neglect the warning thus 

 given, and do not consider what is the most appropriate remedy for dealing 

 with and getting rid of the affliction. Therefore, we find that bodily 

 pain is a means to the preservation of health and life ; and that, far from 

 being an evil, it is a most beneficent thing in connexion with our exist- 

 ence, when looked at from this point of view. I have merely given 

 this as an illustration of the necessity of examining these things from 

 different points of view. In saying, then, whether a thing is good or evil, 

 we have to go, not only to the immediate cause, but to other and more 

 remote causes, and to view it in all its complicated relations to other things 

 before we can arrive at the means of forming anything like a definite judg- 

 ment. If we take a hasty view of the first apparent cause of any given 

 effect we may think it bad ; but, by going deeper, we may discover that it 

 was a very good thing it happened just as it did. So it is with any 

 attempt to survey the world ; and I believe, with regard to the existence of 

 moral evil, and the recognition of the Almighty as a Creator actuated by 

 beneficent views, that there is ample and conclusive proof of what may be 

 termed a moral governance of the world, so perfect in its nature that every 

 human being knows he has a moral consciousness which is part of his mind ; 

 and that if every one in the world has been so created that he possesses 

 moral sentiment, it is clear that this is the result of the moral sense of his 

 Creator, and a recognition of the morality of that Creator as evidenced 

 throughout the human race. But it is said that if this be so, why has the 

 Creator permitted evil ? Here, however, it must be remembered that He 

 has allowed us a moral mind ; that He has given us, at the same time, cer- 

 tain impulses and passions which are necessary for our existence. The 

 question, then, arises, whether there is such a thing as immorality, unless it 

 springs fi-om the immoral thoughts of human beings themselves ; whether, 

 in point of fact, there is such a thing as immorality in the world, except 

 as far as that evil thoughts make evil deeds. (Hear, hear.) If these 

 evil thoughts are our own thoughts, and the sum of the evil in the world is 

 the sum of all the evil thoughts of those who exist upon its surface, and if, 

 also, we have a moral sense, and, therefore, know those thoughts to be evil, 

 how can it be said that people who do immoral things are not themselves 

 responsible for the evil, and that it is not their own creation ? What right, 

 in that case, have they to ascribe it to the Creator ? They have no such 



