THE NATURAL ANB THE ARTIFICIAL. 191 



Let US consider one or two instances of so-called 

 instinct. 



Du Bois Raymond says : " Witli awe and with wonder must 

 the student of nature regard that microscopic molecule of 

 nerve substance Avhich is the seat of the laborious construction, 

 orderly, loyal and dauntless soul of the ant!" 



Huber says : " On the visit of an overseer ant to the works 

 when the labourers had begun tlie roof too soon, he examined 

 it and had it taken down, the wall raised to the proper height, 

 and a new ceiling constructed with the fragments of the old 

 one." 



Romanes shows the sphex wasps provide animal food for 

 their young which they paralyze but do not kilL Crickets 

 have three nerve motor centres to be paralyzed ; one b^jhind 

 the neck, which has to be stretched to get at it and two in 

 other minute points in the body, yet all these are unerringly 

 punctured by the wasp. He adduces this as a specimen of 

 supposed " lapsed intelligence." 



A spider with a big fly could not secure ic, so bit one of its 

 legs, and as the fly stooped its head to its leg, at once 

 secured it with cords thrown over it. 



Birds go through elaborate dramatic performances when 

 their nests are approached, and insects often simulate death. 



Some jackdaws tried to buiM a nest on a sloping window sill 

 outside a church, but the sticks all slipped down, so in five 

 days they constructed a pyramid of sticks resting on a step 

 six feet below and reaching up to the sill to support the nest 

 on which they built it. 



These instances suffice to show that when nerve centres 

 exist how much the actions we loosely term instinctive 

 resemble the results of human reason. No doubt when no 

 nerve centre whatever exists the actions are purely reflex or 

 automatic, but close observers find it hard to believe this is so 

 in higher animals. 



Even if they possess a mind however it is only in its lower 

 qualities. Of self-consciousness, independent will, and moral 

 purposes there is no clear evidence ; and in the absence of 

 free will, there is of course no responsibility. We therefore call 

 the work of animals, however clever and ingenious, as a rule, 

 natural ; thereby implymg that if they have a mind it is not 

 free to act entirely on its own initiation, but that its action 

 can be foretold sufficiently to term its products " natural " 

 rather than " artificial.^' At the same time occasionally the 

 product appears to be so connected with reason and thought 



o 



