298 AKCHDEACON B. POTTER, M.A., ON 
they have formed for themselves on the question: “Is the will 
free, or is it controlled?” You will find religious and anti- 
religious literature much concerned with the subject. You will 
find men excusing license or urging control of desires in 
accordance with their view as to whether or not we possess 
freedom. 
But the second thought which arises in view of this subject 
is whether the question is soluble. There is much that might 
lead us to consider it not so. Because it concerns human 
personality in the depths of its mystery ; and there is no doubt 
that here we are face to face with a problem which eludes us 
almost as constantly and rapidly as problems concerning the 
Divine Nature, or the nature of our Lord Jesus Christ. 
Mystery dwells not only in the infinitely great, but in the 
apparently comprehensible. Still we have always this com- 
forting reflection that even in the most abstruse questions, 
where the intellect finds itself, as Kant described it, attempting 
to fly in a medium of pure space, where for lack of atmosphere, 
it cannot make any way with its wings; even here, there are 
practical solutions of all the problems. And the practical 
solution is usually arrived at by an admission of the incom- 
prehensibility of the question in all its bearings. The human 
mind naturally seeks to unify—to bring every phenomenon 
into a mathematical system, which it can thoroughly com- 
prehend. It is this tendency which has led, in philosophy and 
theology, to so many errors, so much bitterness, so much strife. 
In the free-will problem, men start with the assumption that all 
the phenomena must come under one law, just as in theology they 
have tried to reconcile Love, Mercy ana Omnipotence in the 
Creator. But the effort fails; the solution lies in the admission 
that we must accept contrary facts which we cannot reconcile ; 
and yet which we know must both be true. 
Now what I propose to do to-day is to place before you as 
clearly and honestly as I can, the various arguments, so far as 
I understand them, which have been and are being used, on the 
two sides of this question. I shall then ask you to consider 
whether these opposing theories can be reconciled; and if so, 
what is the true method of reconciliation, and lastly, ask you to 
bear in mind the practical results which are deducible from 
the conclusion at which we arrive. 
First then to take the arguments for Determinism, «e., for 
the: doctrine that men’s wills are ruled by character, desire, _ 
circumstances, and outside influences. 
The matter may best be dealt with by looking at it to 
