302 ARCHDEACON B. POTTER, M.A., ON 
to yield. No other theory than that which allows that the 
will is ruled by passion seems able to account for the fact that 
after months and years of imprisonment men will immediately 
return on release to the crime for which they were punished. 
But, lastly, to take the case of deliberate action, here at any 
rate we may say consciousness proclaims us free. I know I 
can choose. I feel myself free, this is the verdict of self- 
consciousness. 
Let us take the case in which freedom seems most apparent. 
A man resists inclination, conquers impulse, does something he 
does not like to do. Surely this proves him free, and yet, if 
he reflects, after his action, on the cause of his action, he will 
find that a motive determined his will. We say a man has a 
strong will who decides for duty against inclination. But we 
must not forget that the action was due to a higher motive 
being brought into prominence. There were in the man’s 
personality feelings of honour, of duty, of affection. Passion 
clouded these, and the will was giving way. But some influence 
came to bear—a friend’s advice—a thought—a memory—a 
suggestion from the spiritual world; and the higher motive 
came out into prominence, and overcame the passion. If we 
could recall any decision, which had not behind it a motive, a 
reason—then we might deny determinism. But this is not so 
in any single action of our life. Some philosophers have 
ascribed this choice between lower and higher motives to 
reason. But reason does not act immediately on the will. 
Reason is simply the intellectual faculty which penetrates 
into the meaning and results of actions, and makes it clear to 
the self what will follow them. The self then decides. But in 
its decision, it is determined by its character. 
I will now notice two objections usually brought against this 
doctrine. One is that responsibility imples freedom. But as 
Riehl says, “a being whose actions do not depend on anything, 
and therefore do not depend on the consciousness of responsi- 
bility, cannot be responsible. A free unmetived choice is purely 
accidental, and no one is responsible for an accidental occurrence. 
A free being can have no definite character—the essential mark 
of character is persistence.’ Again, “how can determinism 
contradict responsibility, if responsibility is one of the deter- 
mining causes of the will?” Fowler says, “I have said nothing 
of reward or punishment or responsibility, which may be 
explained as liable to punishment, because I think that all 
these facts are equally explicable on the Determinist 
hypothesis.” 
