DETERMINISM AND FREE-WILL. ; 303 
Again it is objected, morality is inconsistent with determinism. 
Here I must quote Riehl again. He says “morality stands, and 
determinism is a scientific truth. As the result of a will acting 
under law, morality is only possible in connection with deter- 
minism. Morality is the ratio cognoscendi of determinism— 
determinism the ratio essendi of morals.” 
Let us now look at the other side of the question, and see 
what can be said in favour of Free-Will. And the one great 
argument, whose force is felt by every thinker, is the universal 
fact of Consciousness of Freedom. As L[llingworth puts it, 
“ Free-Will is a fact of immediate and universal consciousness, 
i.¢., of my own consciousness, corroborated by the like experience 
of all other men.” Fowler says, “we seem to be free, to have 
the power of shaping our own acts.” Why should we praise or 
blame others, or approve or disapprove our own actions, if we 
regard others and ourselves as determined. Spinoza admits 
that “men must regard themselves as free, because they are 
conscious of will and of desire,” though he explains away the 
meaning of this by the theory that it is ignorance of the causes 
behind the will which makes men think themselves free. 
Riehl admits our consciousness of Freedom, and explains the 
reason of it as Spinoza does, only he advances a step further 
and claims to show why men are ignorant of the causes which 
move their will. He thinks that the causes of our actions 
precede self-consciousness, and thus do not enter into it. That 
is to say, we do not become conscious of self till the cause has 
passed into an act of will. So the latter only is perceived— 
and the former not. So he says: “It is easy to see why the 
necessary ignorance of the proper causes of our actions must 
produce the illusion that they are not caused.” Ladd says, 
“They who urge the speculative tenet that all conduct is strictly 
determined, practise as though they were, what they really are, 
as free as the gods themselves.” He speaks of the consciousness 
of freedom as, first, consciousness of ability—that is of the self 
as active: and secondly, a consciousness of imputability, that is 
of the self as responsible. Sedgwick says, “against the for- 
midable array of cumulative evidence offered for determinism, 
there is to be set the immediate aflirmation of consciousness in 
the moment of deliberate action.” However strong may be the 
rush of appetite or anger, it does not present itself to me as 
irresistible. 
And if we deny the reality of this belief of consciousness, 
that I can choose between two alternatives, it would seem as 
though we reduced the whole universe to subjection to material 
