310 ARCHDEACON B. POTTER, M.A., ON 
motor-car has its driver. It is noteworthy that Aristotle assumes, 
not proves, the Freedom of the Will. It is assumed in the teaching 
of our Lord. 
The Rev. F. D. Morice alluded briefly to the difficulty of 
combining a belief in an omniscience to which nothing further is 
unknown, with a belief that will can ever be absolutely free, which 
implies that it is an open question—a question not yet decided— 
which of two alternative choices is in fact going to be made. 
Rey. R. V. FAITHFULL DAvigs.—The subject is eminently one 
on which clear definition of the terms used is essential. Do any 
supporters of Free Will claim that the will is entirely uncontrolled ? 
or that Heredity and Environment have no influence over its 
decisions? Do many Determinists assert that man is entirely a 
machine? Even Mr. Blatchford says, ‘‘I know that I can make 
myself better or worse if I try.” 
Substitute the word “influenced ” for “ruled” or “ determined ” 
in the arguments which the Archdeacon, with characteristically 
scrupulous fairness, brings forward on the Determinist side, and 
you would have a large body of doctrines which would probably be 
accepted by both sides in the perennial controversy. 
The Archdeacon says (page 299), “If a man is free to act 
independently of character and influences, he probably will so act.” 
But why? Surely the probabilities are all the other way. It is 
indeed possible that a man of high character may act, on a given 
occasion, in a manner entirely contrary to his usual habits. But 
the probability of his doing so is so slight that the possibility may 
safely be ignored. May it not be the case that the whole subject 
suffers from attempts at over-analysis? To quote the words of 
John Caird (Philosophy of Meligion, p. 115), “In every part of 
consciousness the whole is present; in all the phenomena of mind, 
the ego or self is the universal and constant factor. You may 
attempt, as has often been done, to apply material analogies to 
mental phenomena, as when moral action is represented as the result 
of the force of motives acting on the will. But the analysis here is 
a purely fallacious one. . . . It is the mind that is moved which 
constitutes or gives their constraining power to the motives that are 
conceived to move it.” 
The freedom then that we claim is not specifically the freedom of 
the will, in isolation, but the freedom of the whole personality to 
