DETERMINISM AND FREE-WILL. ant 
choose between the various motives, whether suggested from without 
or self-supplied, to add to, or subtract from, the weight of each, 
and then to follow the strongest. 
Sir Oliver Lodge claims it as the distinctive character of man that 
‘“‘he has a sense of responsibility for his acts, having acquired the 
power of choosing between good and evil, with freedom to obey one 
motive rather than another.” (Catechism, p. 24.) 
I heartily join in thanking the Archdeacon for his careful and 
instructive paper. 
Rey. W. TEMPLETON KING, B.D., said that previous speakers did 
not seem to realize the difficulty of the question. 
He put forth as a possible solution the thought that the will 
might have power not to act against overwhelming influences, but to 
choose among contrary motives which it will yield to. 
Professor H. LANGHORNE ORCHARD.—I wish to join in thanking 
the learned author of this paper for a thoughtful and suggestive 
inquiry into a problem of such subtlety that leaders in philosophy 
have taken views which have issued in contradictory solutions. 
On some points in this valuable paper I find myself unable to 
concur with the author as, ¢.g., in the statement (or belief) that the 
will is at one and the same time both free and not free (see p. 304, 
par. 4); and he seeks to justify this idea by asserting that, if it were 
not so, “we might assume that, as there was no mystery in our 
human nature, we did not partake of the Divine” (p. 307). Surely 
there is enough “ mystery” in human nature, without adding to it 
the insoluble complication that contradictory propositions are 
simultaneously true. The paper omits what appears to me to be an 
important argument in favour of Free Will, drawn from our 
intuition of Causality. We may state the argument as follows :— 
Every effect has a cause, 7.c., the power producing the effect. But 
power is incompatible with the presence of constraint. Power 
implies absence of constraint, implies, therefore, freedom. Cause, 
then, is free. Consciousness gives the idea of cause in will; there- 
fore, will is free. 
Perhaps the strongest of all the arguments for Free Will is the 
testimony of consciousness, held by Sir Wm. Hamilton to be decisive. 
We know intuitively that we are free to will for or against, and to 
choose this or that. To assume that our intuitions deceive us would 
be to suppose God a deceiver. Further, since, in the last analysis, 
x 
