DETERMINISM AND FREE-WILL. 313 
with the conflicting conclusions of abstract thought. The former is 
the truer guide. All of us are conscious of some measure of freedom 
of will, and we invariably act upon that consciousness in the affairs 
of daily life. When we find an irresponsible person, we place him 
in an asylum. A strong-willed man, who was arguing with me in 
favour of determinism, suddenly beat his dog for its misbehaviour, 
so I asked him why he acted on the assumption that his dog was 
responsible for its action, if its master was irresponsible ? Of course, 
heredity and environment are factors which do much to determine 
the actions of the will, but the will also determines its response and 
reaction to circumstances. The terms moral and immoral are mean- 
ingless, unless the words can and ought are applicable to human 
conduct, and according to Determinist philosophy our will is the 
mere slave of circumstances. This applies to the community as a 
whole—which is made up of individuals. All human achievement 
is born of the conviction that we are justified in saying “I ought, 
I can, I will.” 
Rev. JoHN TUCKWELL, M.R.A.S.—At this late hour I will not do 
more than add briefly one or two thoughts to this discussion. First 
of all I fear we are too apt to confuse our wills with our personality. 
Surely the will is the power of self-determination possessed by the 
ego. All language recognizes this fact. We consider the course of 
conduct we propose to ourselves and then we say, “I will.” We 
must admit also, I think, that we have the power to choose from 
what motives we will act, and that our character is formed by the 
frequency of our choice from one set of motives. But it is impossi- 
ble to get back to the beginning of the formation of character. 
How it is that a child in the first dawn of its intelligence is prompted 
to act from one motive rather than another we cannot tell. It tells 
a lie, perhaps, and finds that it gains some advantage thereby. The 
first success may become a motive for repeating the act until it 
grows to be a liar. 
If, however, we accept the view of the Archdeacon and believe in 
the pre-existence of the soul, then it seems to me we are floundering 
in a Serbonian bog. How can we tell with what impact from that 
previous state we come into the world? And how can we tell to 
what extent we are to be held responsible for our actions? The 
Archdeacon says, ‘our Lord constantly reminded men that they 
were the sons of God.” But He told certain of the Jews who 
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