DETERMINISM AND FREE-WILL.  . og 
Does not Determinism, in the usual and narrow sense, mean the 
sum total of those influences and impulses which are absolutely 
irresistible? In such cases freedom of will is nil, and the ego is 
either an insane person, or an incorrigible drunkard, or a man- 
animal. But in the higher and wider sense which you, I think, most 
rightly adopt, does it not rather mean the sum total of ail influences, 
including religion, education, art, science, taste, etc. ? In this case, 
too, one’s freedom of will, though by no means nil, is morally 
reduced to a minimum, one’s conduct being morally determined. 
These are, of course, extreme cases, conduct in the one case being 
physically, on the other morally determined. But the intermediate 
cases seem to be those where the conflict between determining 
influences and will really arises—the conflict of the will with all 
influences, both good and bad, both physical and moral. 
Professor H. WHITE (King’s College, London) writes :— 
One of the chief points with which I was struck was that almost 
all the writers quoted seemed to confuse between moral freedom and 
what I may call philosophical freedom of the will. 
We must all agree that action is the result of motives, and that 
when we do anything it is because the motives which urged us to 
do it were stronger than those which urged us not to doit. We 
must all be determinists in this sense: we are all slaves to 
motives. 
But this is something in a quite different category from the 
question of a man tecling within his better self that he ought to act 
one way, and then being driven by passion to act another : he is 
here a slave in a new sense, because he is not free to do what 
conscience tells him he ought to do, 
Then moral freedom does not mean uncertainty: if a man is 
absulutely upright and has his feelings thoroughly under control, 
he has freedom of the will in the moral sense ; and yet you can 
calculate, sometimes with almost mathematical accuracy, and a long 
way ahead, how he will act in certain given sets of circumstances. 
Mr. A. C. CHAMPNEYS writes :— 
It appears to me: 
(1) That whatever arguments may be used in favour of Deter- 
minism, the underlying presupposition almost always is that the will 
must follow the analogy of material things, which appear (at all 
events) to follow an unchanging sequence or “law.” 
