DETERMINISM AND FREE-WILL. 319 
It may be open to argument whether or not the boy in imbibing 
moral teaching so as to improve his character is exercising free will, 
or being influenced by pre-existing character. But I did not refer to 
this in the passage referred to, my point was that when the character 
is formed the after conduct answers to the helm. 
Mr. Champneys states that arguments in favour of determinism 
almost always presuppose that the will must follow the analogy of 
material things ; but in my paper there was no such assumption, and 
no reference to material law, nor was there any assumption that a 
motive to be a cause must be irresistible—only the bare statement 
proved by examples that motives do influence the actions. At 
the same time it must be remembered that although 
history and judgment of character may not be exact sciences, 
the reason of this may be the infinite number of causes, many 
unknown to the actor, behind the human will. Mathematics is an 
exact science, because its scope is limited. 
Professor Kirkpatrick seems to put the matter very clearly. He 
sees that I do not use the word determinism in its narrower sense : 
but in its “higher and wider sense,” in which as he says it means: 
“the sum total of all influences including religion, education, art, 
science, taste, etc.,” and in this case he admits that “ our conduct is 
morally determined.” 
Mr. Tuckwell thinks we are ina “ Serbonian bog” if we believe in 
the pre-existence of the soul. Has he noted that the great mass of 
the arguments in the Phedo for immortality depend on the belief in 
pre-existence? If we came into existence at birth, does it not seem 
probable that we pass out of existence at death? How can there be 
an immortality & parte post, if not & parte ante % 
As regards punishment, even if a man could not resist temptation, 
he still should be punished, because the fear of further penalties will 
act as a deterrent, by bringing the motive of fear into play. 
