REV. PREBENDARY WACE, D.D., ON ETHICS AND RELIGION. 129 
and of society alike that the chief false routes of moral 
life should be barred by plain and authoritative prohibitions, 
But there is another ground on which the need of some 
such authoritative guidance on the main principles of 
morality is apparent. Perhaps one of the strangest points 
in the position of human nature is that the primary and 
fundamental principles on which morality should be based 
are admitted by the best authorities to be undetermined. 
No one in this country can be regarded as a more decisive 
witness on this subject than Professor Sidgwick, of Cam- 
bridge, whose methods of ethics and outlines of the history 
of ethics, are recognized text books among us; and one of 
his lectures in the volume now under notice has some re- 
markable statements on this point. He is dealing (pp. 148 
sq.) with the need which is felt by men of really practical 
character for some higher guidance than ordinary experience 
can give them in the difficulties of hte—“ men whose reflec- 
tion has made them aware that in their individual efforts 
after right living they have often to grope and stumble 
along an imperfectly lighted path.” Practical men of this 
stamp, he says, “ will recognize that the effort to construct a 
theory of right is not a matter of mere speculative interest, 
but of the deepest practical import.” Itis desirable, therefore, 
he says, “that philosophers should co-operate with earnest 
and thoughtful persons who are not philosophers in con- 
structing an ethical system.” 
But how is it that this work has not already, after the 
long centuries during which it has been under discussion, 
been already accomplished by philosophers? ‘The reason,” 
says Professor Sidgwick, ‘“‘ why the work remains to be done, 
lies in the fundamental disagreement that has hitherto existed 
among philosophers as to the principles and methods of 
ethical construction ; and so long as this disagreement con- 
tinues, how is co-operation possible?” He thinks there is 
more willingness now among philosophers to co-operate than 
there has been in other times; but still he apprehends that 
“even under these favourable conditions, the labour of this con- 
struction is likely to be long; and how in the meantime—so 
long as their fundamental disagreements are unremoved— 
can they effectually combine to assist individual and social 
efforts after right living? So long as they are not agreed on 
the ultimate end of action—so long as one holds it to be 
moral perfection, another ‘ general happiness,’ another 
‘ efficiency of the social organism ’—how can any counsels 
K 
