INSTINCT AND REASON. 85 
nature, could, by a stretch of imagination, have been so 
developed as to reach the higher plane of the moral sense 
and spiritual faculties of Man. 
So also, with regard to what is called “animal intel- 
ligence,” it is claimed for them that “there is no funda- 
mental difference between Man and the higher mammals in 
their mental faculties,” while, however, it has to be admitted 
that ‘the difference between the mind of the lowest Man 
and that of the highest animal is immense.” But the 
doctrine is taught that this immense difference is, after all, 
“one of degree only, and not of kind.” In other words, 
they are upon the same plane, continuous one with the 
other ; and there is, therefore, a theoretical possibility of the 
one being converted or developed into the other; and that, 
in point of fact, it was so converted. 
But we believe that arguments can be adduced which 
tend to disclose a wide chasm between the apparently intel- 
ligent actions of animals and the real intellectual operations 
of Man; and to prove that Man has become the dominant 
animal—not simply because, through some unknown and 
entirely speculative influences, he has rapidly evolved a high 
standard of moral sense and a lofty ideal of intellectual 
grandeur—but because he is essentially distinct in his non- 
material nature from what are called, not poetically only, 
but most truly and correctly also, the lower animals; and 
also because moral sense and responsibility are his attributes 
by an absolutely special and peculiar privilege, while his 
intellectual powers themselves differ toto evlo from those of 
the lower animals, not merely in degree but in very essence 
and kind. In support of which propositions we offer the 
following remarks and suggestions. 
We are not inclined to dispute the fact that certain 
animals exhibit mental phenomena which, upon a superficial 
view, may easily be imagined to-be similar to, if not identi- 
cal in character with, analogous phenomena in Man. But 
we would, at the outset, draw attention to a certain distinc- 
tion between the phenomena as exhibited by two widely 
different classes of animals; viz., first, those exhibited by 
animals comparatively low in the scale of organisation, but 
which have, by the singularity and apparent complexity, 
attracted the interested attention of mankind in all ages—— 
such as, for example, the construction of geometrical cells by 
the hive bee and symmetrical webs by the spider, or the 
various complex habits of the families of ants; and second, 
the half-reasoning (as the poet calls it) efforts of animals of 
H 
