INSTINCT AND REASON. 99 
_ Animals, however, inasmuch as they are imbued with this 
affection which constitutes their nature or very life, must be 
capable of certain cognitions. They must be possessed of 
what perhaps cannot be strictly called “knowledge,” so 
much as cognitions of certain sensuous perceptions which 
affect them, either agreeably or disagreeably, and which 
they recognise as affording sensations either of pleasure or 
of pam. Such cognitions are essential to that affection or 
nature into which they are born; for the two are inseparable, 
and proceed pari passu, knowledge of any kind always pro- 
ducing a corresponding affection. And the sounds which 
animals utter are always characteristic and expressive of 
these cognitions and associated sensations; and although, as 
a rule, these sounds are limited to a discordant cry, this cry 
is capable of considerable modification in accordance with 
the emotion, which varies as successive cognitions are 
aroused by sensuous associations or by sensuous memory. 
But although the cries of animals may be loosely called a 
language, it 1s totally different both in nature and in kind 
from the intellectual or articulate language used by reason- 
ing beings, and which is as clearly a distinctive mark of 
intelligence, properly so called, as the cries of animals are of 
their sensuous perceptions or affections. For Speech pre- 
supposes Reason, and becomes more complex and imore 
perfect in its power and in its forms of expression in propor- 
tion as the intellectual faculties are cultivated, always 
following their development with vocabularies framed to 
suit the growth of intelligence, and to express ideas which 
have already been conceivea within the mind. 
Moreover, a8 we have remarked, there is no neglected 
savage who cannot be taught to speak intelligibly ; nor is 
there an infant whose powers of reasoning are in a normal 
condition to whom (by hearing) speech does not come as 
naturally as the breath he draws. Whereas no animal 
whatever has the faintest or remotest capability for this 
erucial endowment; * any more than it can smile, make fire, 
or manufacture a tool. 
So also are the gestures of animals mere unreasoning’ 
reflections of their sensuous states, consisting indeed of 
unrestrained movements, which, in many respects, interpret 
* The announcement not long since that a learned man of science was 
about to teach his dog the art of conversation, and had already commenced 
his lessons, did not unduly alarm us. We believe the result has not yet 
been striking. Nor need it scarce be remarked that talking birds are 
vox et preterea nihil. 
VOLE. X XT Ve I 
