2 SIR M. MONIER WILLIAMS ON THE MONISM, PANTHEISM, AND 
sophical terms current in Europe, I believe I am right in 
stating that Monism is a term which may be fairly used to 
express the doctrine that only one Being really exists—or, in» 
other words, that everything is resolvable into one eternal 
Essence, and into one only. 
Pantheism, again, so far as I understand this vague expres- 
sion, generally means that, whatever the one infinite Essence 
or Substance, whom we call God, may be, the Universe is 
identical with that one God, or again that God is identical 
with the Universe (not merely immanent or present in it). 
Dualism, on the other hand, is a term which is generally 
employed to express the existence of two co-eternal princi- 
ples, neither of which is the product of the other. 
But there may be different kinds of Monism, Pantheism, 
and Dualism. 
For example, there may be a kind of Monism which consists 
in believing that matter is the one only really existing thing, 
and that Spirit is merely a form or modification of Matter. 
Again, there may be another kind of Monism which, like 
the Monism of the Indian Vedanta, teaches that Spirit is the 
one really existing (Sanskrit paramarthika) thing, and that 
material (jada) forms are merely modifications or illusory 
(pratibhasika) manifestations of this one all-pervading Spirit. 
Or, again, there may be another kind of Monism which 
substitutes the term “ Mind” for “Spirit,” maintaining that 
Mind (including, of course, volition) is the only eternally 
existing Essence, and that Mind creates or evolves out of 
itself all material organisms, and the whole external world. 
It should be noted, however, that this idea of Mind is 
opposed to the doctrine of Indian philosophers, who make 
Mind (manas) an internal organ (antah-karana) developed by 
and belonging to the perishable body, and occupying an 
intermediate position between the organs of perception (such 
as the eye, ear, &c.) and the organs of action (such as the 
hand, foot, &c.), its sole function being to serve as an instru- 
ment or inlet of thought to the Spirit. 
Again, some writers substitute the term “ Soul” for “ Spirit,” 
or employ these two expressions as if they were identical. 
Perhaps the chief objection to the indiscrimimate use of 
the terms “ Spirit” and “Soul,” at least in Indian philosophy, 
appears to be that our word “Soul” conveys the idea of 
liability to affections, passions, and feelings, whereas pure 
Spirit, according to the Vedanta, is not liable to emotions of 
any kind, and does not even possess se/f-consciousness, Or a 
sense of individuality. It is Nir-guna, quality-less. 
