28 SIR M. MONIER WILLIAMS ON THE MONISM, PANTHEISM, AND 
NOTE. 
The following are the remarks by the Rev. C. G. Chitten- 
den, B.A., referred to in a note to page 12 of Sir Monier 
Williams’s paper :— 
Page 2, paragraph 1.—“I believe I am right,” &. In the 
popular discussion of these questions in the present day, ‘‘Monism 
and Dualism” seem to be used, each in two different ways :— 
(1) To denote opinions as to the cause of phenomena; whether 
they are the result of the existence of Mind alone; or of Matter 
alone (Monism): or whether they result from the mutual action of 
both, being distinct existences (Dualism). This use may be called 
** Metaphysical’? Monism and Dualism. 
(2) To denote opinions on the origin of the moral world as it is 
presented to us in this life; whether it is the work of one Being 
or of two, and this use may be called ‘“‘ Hthical’? Monism and 
Dualism. 
It may he observed with reference to ‘‘ Metaphysical’ Monism, 
that, to minds of a metaphysical cast, Bishop Berkeley’s Idealistic 
Monism is more easily conceivable than what may be called 
Material Monism, viz.—that Mind is a product or function of 
Matter. 
Berkeley’s theory is consistent with itself, and the chief argu- 
ment against it is a ‘“‘ dualistic instinct’ in man. 
Page 11, last paragraph.—Isaiah xlv, 6, 7. 
Here “evil” being opposed to ‘‘ peace”? must mean “ physical 
evil,” “adversity.” 
Page 12, last paragraph.—“ We know too that this freedom of 
choice,” &c. 
‘“‘ Ethical Dualism ” seems to be the refuge of some minds from 
the difficulties of ‘ Ethical Monism ” in attempting to account for 
the existence of moral evil. (See 8. Laing’s ‘‘Modern Zoroastrian.) 
Bishop Butler (“ Analogy of Religion,” Part I, Chapter 5), 
considers that a partial explanation of the entrance of moral evil 
among finite beings, is furnished by the fact of their having par- 
ticular “affections ”’ or “ propensions.” 
But the difficulty of many minds (e.g., J. S. Mill) is in conceiv- 
ing that a Being who is all-good, all-wise, and all-powerful, would 
permit a state of things in which moral evil should exist. (See 
“Three Essays on Religion,” Theism, Part II.) 
