ON HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY. 53 
moment, temptation prevail, a painful impression is produced, but, if the 
temptation be withstood and overcome, the result is pleasing. In these 
respects the moral sense is like the other senses, which perceive equality 
or inequality in the things which concern them, and produce corresponding 
impressions. But the conscience or moral sense of one man is not con- 
cerned with the overt acts, much less the motives, of another man. The 
overt acts of others may be judged of by the Reason, and, if good, followed, 
if bad, shunned ; but it must not be forgotten that what is good, or at 
least harmless, for one man, may be extremely blameworthy in another. 
The rules that suit everybody are broad indeed. Caius Toranius may 
have been, and probably was, the greatest blackguard imaginable ; but 
to reprobate his conduct will not mend matters for me. The question for 
my conscience is, how far my present conduct tallies with my present light. 
Moreover, the moral sense can be blunted and destroyed, or educated and 
refined, much as any other. This and various circumstances concur to 
produce at different times, and in different localities, habits and customs 
which differ greatly on the score of morality. But to deny the existence of a 
moral sense on this account, is like denying the sense of hearing, because 
the accepted music of one nation is discord and confusion to another; or 
like denying the sense of sight, because one man beholds beauty where 
another sees only so much canvas and paint.” 
The author of that paper adds, “TI do not think Lord Grimthorpe means 
us to swallow Paley whole, simply because he was Senior Wrangler, the 
writer of several useful books, and a generally sound logician. Even at 
Cambridge, his influence has long passed its zenith, and to show how 
pendulums swing, the Dean of one of the Colleges there lately told me 
that he could hardly regard Paley in the light of a Christian—quite an 
undeserved aspersion. 
“But to appeal to Scripture. If there be no authoritative principle in 
the natural man, how comes it that St. Paul in the text on which Bishop 
Butler’s three sermons on Human Nature are based, speaks of those who, 
having not the law, ‘do by nature the things contained in the law,’ of the 
‘work of the law written in their hearts,’ of their ‘conscience bearing 
witness,’ and their ‘thoughts accusing or else excusing one another.’ 
That which is chiefly condemned is, ‘holding the truth in unrighteous- 
ness. But if the conscience were infallible, St. Paul would not have 
spoken of doing a thing ‘ignorantly in unbelief’ asa reason for obtaining 
mercy, nor would Christ Himself have foretold that certain persons would 
think they were ‘ doing God service’ in persecuting His Church. 
“ At the same time, as I have elsewhere said, the only moral sentiment 
with which, by nature or grace, we are endowed, excepting that which 
though higher in degree we have in common with the beasts, is to be 
found in the struggle described by St. Paul: ‘The flesh lusteth against 
