ON THE REALITY OF THE SELF. 209 
Mr. T. Barkwortn.—It is of course impossible for so vast and 
complex a subject as the nature of mind to be dealt with 
adequately within the compass of a single Paper. More es- 
pecially is this evident when we come to consider the various 
systems and almost countless works that have been produced in 
connection with the question, What is Mind? Nor is the result 
encouraging to the study of Metaphysics. For the only sure 
progress that seems to have been made, leading to ascertained 
conclusions, is in the direction of inductive research, and the 
mode of investigation has necessarily become the property of the 
physiologist rather than of the metaphysician. Nevertheless there 
is one important category of mental phenomena without consider- 
ing which no survey of the nature of mind can be regarded as 
complete—I mean the automatic processes of mental action. It 
has been too much the fashion to speak of the mind in relation 
to consciousness, and to disregard those unconscious actions which 
nevertheless occasionally display a very high order of intelli- 
gence. When the author speaks of the mind, does he mean the 
mind that directs these unconscious proceedings, or the mind that 
is preoccupied and absorbed simultaneously with a totally different 
subject? To take one or two examples by way of illustration. 
A man is threading his way through a crowded street while his 
mind is deeply engrossed with some scientific or political question; 
he pays no attention to the state of the thoroughfare, and will 
very likely end by tinding himself at some more familiar destin- 
ation than the one he intended to make for. 
Again, mental automatism is even more interesting than physical. 
Thus, it has been found possible to add up long columns of figures, 
or play through a piece of music at sight, while the attention is so 
absorbed in a train of thought, that the individual is unconscious 
‘not only of what he is doing, but even of where he is. Is it the 
conscious or unconscious mind which is the real self? These and 
similar instances would alone have been sufficient to throw doubt 
upon any view of mind which regarded it as a single homogeneous 
entity. I cannot enter further into this interesting subject to-night. 
But the dualism of mind in the form of a primary'and secondary 
consciousness, or, as I should prefer to call them, an active and 
passive personality, which may be broadly classified as volitional 
and ratiocinative on the one hand, and automatic and emotional 
ou the other, may, I think, be now considered as established, not 
