214 W. L. COURTNEY, M.A., LL.D., 
Reference was made by the speaker who preceded me to an 
argument which is put with the greatest force and clearnessin the 
works of the late T. H. Green. That writer, indeed, seems to have 
said almost the last word upon the subject we are considering this 
evening. Particularly valuable is that part of his Prolegomena - 
to Kthics which deals with ‘‘the spiritual principle in Know- 
ledge.” Inone place Mr. Green points out that our knowledge is a 
knowledge of related things and events, of things and events, past 
and present, which stand in certain definite relations one to the 
other in time and space. ‘‘ We speak,” he says, “of a world of 
things,” of “a universe of things,” thus indicating our belief that 
the objects of Nature around us form parts of an organised system 
of related things, and he urges, with great force, as it seems to 
me, that the subject which embraces the data of its experience in 
the unity of such a system must be something different from any 
of the objects with which it thus deals. No member of a series of 
objects or phenomena can, he contends, be knowledge of that series 
as a series. Further, in dealing with memory, he points out that 
it is not simply the revival of a past sensation, but something very 
different, namely, the recollection that, at a certain time, and in a 
certain place, IJ had such an experience. May I add that in ¢con- 
sidering this question I have derived much indirect assistance 
from a careful study of Rosmini's Origin of Ideas. 
The AvutHor.—l ought to begin by thanking those who 
have spoken for the kindness with which they have received the 
few remarks I have been able to make on this subject; and I 
think they fully recognise, as I certainly do myself, how difficult 
it is to get into a short Paper the various considerations which 
would occur to one in dealing with a subject of this complexity ~ 
and immensity. 
The point which is of extreme interest to all of us exists in the 
relation, which has been touched on by one of the speakers, be- 
tween unconscious and conscious force of mind—between automatic 
functions and those which cannot be described as automatic. In 
the illustration given by Mr. Barkworth it was urged that a man 
can walk through the streets of London without being conscious | 
of where he is, though all the time he gets straight to his 
destination. That is true, and it is in regard to all those 
phenomena of ordinary life that I tried, if I may say so frankly, 
to give as much as I could possibly conceive of the physiological 
