218 W. di, COURTNEY.: MAG LED 
The Rev. J. J. Lias, M.A., writes :— 
Mr. Courtney’s reputation stands too high for any one to 
venture upon the attitude of a ‘‘superior person” towards 
him. I must therefore content myself with a few humble sugges- 
tions. 
The thanks of us all are due to Mr. Courtney for his habit of 
eschewing verbiage, and going straight to the root of the matter. 
Nevertheless I would venture to express a doubt whether he is 
quite right in saying that mind can only be defined in part. As 
regards abstract metaphysical definition he is no doubt right. As 
I have myself said before the Institute, abstract metaphysical 
definition seems to be an impossibility. You have only to require 
the definer to define each term he uses in his definition to reduce 
all attempts at definition to an absurdity. But definition by 
examples is always possible. And mind can thus be defined as the 
force or energy which produces certain results. The nature of 
that force or energy may be inferred from those results and from 
the mode in which they are obtained. And without attempting to 
carry this line of inquiry further (which is to me impossible at 
present) it would seem clear that mind belongs to the same cate- 
gory as force, and to be, as far as we are able to judge, outside 
the sphere of matter altogether, although continually acting upon 
it, and known to us chiefly through the medium of such action. 
I say chiefly, not exclusively, because the action of mind is also 
known to us through our consciousness, and consciousness, although 
also expressing itself through physical media, appears also to rest 
on a basis outside the world of sense. I confess, therefore, that 
on page 196 I should have preferred to have used the term “ organ ” 
in preference to ‘‘ seat” in regard to the relation of the brain to 
conscious mental states. I mean that I look upon the brain not 
as the ultimate home of consciousness, but as the medium whereby 
facts are transmitted from the ultra-physical to the physical world. 
So again when Descartes is represented (page 197) as saying that 
the soul “exists in the brain,” it would surely be more in accord- 
ance with facts to say that it operates through the brain. Again 
(pages 197-8), I would ask if the words ‘absolutely distinct” and 
“absolutely antithetical ” can be fairly considered as synonymous. 
T am “absolutely distinct,” in regard to the process of volition, 
from any other human being; yet I trust I am not therefore 
“absolutely antithetical.” And if not “ absolutely antithetical,” 
there is no reason why I should not influence another. So with 
matter and mind; they are “absolutely distinct * in their essen- 
tial nature. But that does not preclude relations between them, 
though we may be quite incapable of understanding how such 
relations are produced. The phrase “absolutely antithetical ” 
seems to assume the impossibility of such relations, and therefore 
to be in direct opposition to the facts. 
