282 THE REV. H. J. CLARKE ON 
ower. The latter he furiously resents and obstinately with- 
stands, to the former he submissively yields, even when the 
tone of voice in which the word is uttered and the accom- 
panying gestures are not adapted to excite a sympathetically 
responsive affection. likely to prove stronger than opposing 
inclinations. This, he does, plainly, in many a case, from 
no fear of measuring the brute strength he feels in himself 
against his master’s ability to resist it, but from what, unless 
some designation more appropriate can be found, may, 1 
think, be fitly named a sense of duty. 
But sense is not consciousness, nor does it by any means 
presuppose this in its operation as a motive. ‘That such is 
the case, the actions of the lower animals render evident. 
To ali appearance the most intelligent among them exercise 
no discernment whatsoever of an introspective kind; an 
inferior nature subject, it would seem, in this respect to rigid 
conditions, hides from them entirely the springs of intellectual 
and emotional movement,and their mental activity is, in its very 
restricted range, exclusively objective. That the restrictive 
conditions to which I allude are as rigid as they seem to be, 
I do not take for granted, nor do I hold myself at liberty to 
assume that they will never give way in the process of a 
continuous evolution. At present, I am simply describing 
phenomena, and what I have just asserted is the experienced 
impossibility of awakening in the mind of any creature on 
earth, below the rank of man, the faintest perception of the 
fact that it has a mind, and that there the motives are to be 
found from which it acts. To condense into a brief and 
comprehensive staterment the substance of what, as it appears 
to me, I have shown sufficient warrant for aftirming in respect 
to animals of the inferior races, | would say, that some are 
eifted with a sense of duty, but none with what may properly 
be called a conscience. 
Now, the endowments of the human mind include a 
capacity for introspection. Man can look into his own mind 
and observe its operations. If they involve conflicting 
emotions of ethical importance, the interior action may be, 
and often is, more than a mere struggle, resulting in the 
victory of the strongest: such is his mentai constitution, that 
he has power to arbitrate between them, and in so doing to 
determine for himself which of them ought to prevail. 
Herein, he possesses a privilege which he may be forced at 
4imes to exercise in spite of efforts of reluctant will, while 
still exempt from absolute constraint to carry nto execution 
the judgment he has pronounced, though subjected to self- 
