298 THE REV. H.-J. CLARKE ON 
satisfied in regard to one or two of his deductions. On his 
second page he says, ‘‘ Now the word duty implies that in the matter 
with respect to which it is used, something is conceived as being 
due (debitum).” That is perfectly true on one condition, that the 
matter the duty relates to is our sense of responsibility which 
springs from moral obligation, and which belongs more to the 
sense of rectitude than to that of Deontology. The Author says 
in the next instance, ‘‘If, however, for ‘due’ we substitute 
‘ wanting,’ we get aconcept which is preferable,” and further down 
he continues :—‘“‘ And thus on the supposition that the experiences 
which originated and have perpetuated the notion afford materials 
available for the elaboration of a science, Deontology may claim to 
be accepted as its most appropriate name.” I confess I know 
them not, nor can I see how substituting a word for ‘‘ due,” which 
the Chairman explained clearly, can make those experiences 
known to us. We know very well from our experiences of a sense 
of duty what they are. We have, through them, the knowledge 
of a consciousness of rectitude. Again, the Author draws the 
distinction between psychic and pneumatic affection, and he 
draws the comparison between man and the lower animals, 
in reference to the psychic and pneumatic affections. I deny 
that the lower animals display to human intellect a knowledge 
of duty, but the Author again assumes what I cannot agree with, 
and that is that the lower animals have a psychic affection that may 
be called a sense of duty. Weareasked on the third page to observe 
how the lower animals behave when detected in an act of dis- 
obedience. ‘The manifestation of fear may possibly in such a 
ease be insignificant, or even wil.” And we are told this psychic 
affection arises from a sense of shame, and he says, “‘ But asense of 
shame implies a sense of duty.” I do not agree with that. I say 
that a sense of shame implies a sense of something wrong being 
done, or guilt, and a sense of wrong implies—at least, an abstract 
thought in the individual, and that comes from ourselves being 
cognisant of a moral obligation, and that again arises from our 
consciousness of rectitude. [It is due to Dr. Panter to say that 
by reason of illness he could not correct the report of his speech. 
—KHp. | 
Professor H. LancHorne Orcuarp, M.A., B.Sc.—If I were to say 
what part of this Paper has most charmed me I should select 
the latter portion on Utilitarianism. I must, however, agree with 
