300 THE REV. H. J. CLARKE ON 
two different things in opposition to each other. I must differ from 
the Author as to the use of the terms “‘ evolved,” “ developed,” and 
*‘erown,” with regard to this pneumatic sense of duty. If it be 
not innate, where does it come from? If it is evolved, what is 
evolved. It is not a psychic sense of duty, as the Author points 
out. Ifit is not evolved from that, it could not be evolved from 
anything whatever. I must contend that the sense of duty is from 
law, and is essentially innate. In fact, the Author says in one 
place that duty is essentially innate in man and yet he appears 
to say that infants may be without it, and there may be some 
human beings that do not possess it. As to Herod and John the 
Baptist, I do not think there was any conflict of duty, but it was 
simply that Herod preferred to please man—the daughter of Hero- 
dias—rather than Gop. That is, to my mind, the interpretation. 
With regard to feeling the consequent sense of shame, surely 
the command implied, first, the possession by Adam of the sense 
of duty. Had there been no sense of duty already existing in him, 
I do not see how there would have been any guilt in breaking 
the command. It was because he did what he knew he ought 
not to do—in other words, because he went against his sense of 
duty—that he sinned. The sense of duty would not be evolved 
by the sin, but existed at first. 
The Author has made a most valuable distinction between man 
and the brutes with regard to the sense of duty. If they be 
allowed to have any at all, it is certainly very different indeed to 
that possessed by man; and I thank the Author for so well and 
ably bringing out that distinction. 
Mr. Cuartes Browne.—lam entirely in accord with the remarks 
made at the beginning as to the etymology of the word. No 
doubt the word ‘“‘ Deon” is used in respect of duty in the sense of 
tying together, the idea of duality being very generally implied 
by the use of the D (Delta) in those words which represent the 
dealing in any way with two things; either as in words com- 
pounded of Dis and De representing severance of one thing into 
two; or, as in ‘‘ duo,” “duplex,” etc., representing the connection 
of two things together. Thus in the words Dei, Deon, Duty, etc., 
the notion conveyed is the tying together of two things, namely 
the person who is bound to do a thing and the supreme authority 
that compels him to do it; and thus there is a very plain con- 
nection or correspondence in sense between the words “ Duty,” 
