3802 THE REV. H. J. CLARKE ON 
implies—that is, not only the mere recognition of the facts, but 
the reflection upon them, the submission of them to the criticism 
of the moral sense and the pronunciation of the judgment upon 
them formed by that sense, whether they are right or wrong, with 
all the consequences that follow on that judgment; none of 
which processes beyond the mere “consciousness ” of the facts are 
implied in the French word “conscience.” 
The Cuarrman.—I will now call upon the Author to reply. 
The AutHor.—The first remark I have to make is in regard to 
the explanation I have given of the word ééov. I traced the 
meaning of that word as far as I could and in so doing I had in 
my mind the various senses in which it is employed, and it seemed 
to me that the prevailing one is that which is expressed by the 
wor wanting. Whether I reached an absolute limit in my 
investigation it is impossible for me to say. But I appeared to 
arrive at a simple conception of the meaning of the word which I 
could assert as the basis of the conception of duty. Now, I will 
explain why it is that I have found it necessary to distinguish 
between a psychic and a pneumatic sense of duty. I think it 
must be admitted by all who know anything of the habits of 
intelligent animals that they really have a sense of shame. It is 
no theory of mine, and I took for granted that it would be 
generally admitted. Ithink Dr. Panter denied that animals had a 
sense of shame. 
Dr. Panrer.—I said they had not a sense of duty. 
The AurHor.—I thought you denied that they had a sense of 
shame, and that you resolved the appearance of a sense of shame 
into a mere manifestation of fear. That appears to me to be your 
argument and it seems to me that if there is a natural sense of 
shame, that sense of shame implies a sense of duty. What you 
assert is that they have asense of disobedience and yet not a sense of 
duty ; but howcananyone haveasenseof disobedience without having 
a sense of duty? What doesitmean? A failure to discharge a duty 
is a breach of duty. Any person who has asense that he has violated 
an obligation certainly must have a sense of duty. Sense of duty 
has a prospective significance in relation tc the consciousness of dis- 
obedience, so to speak. I do not maintain that animals have a 
consciousness of duty. Idrawaclear distinction between sense and 
consciousness. But animals appear to have, as we have, a moral 
sense—a sense of justice. I think the last speaker allowed that 
