304 THE REV. H. J. CLARKE ON 
sense of duty. The pneumatic man is one who, recognising the 
Father of his spirit, acts from the highest sense of duty—he is the 
spiritual man. He is able to discern spiritual things—the 
spiritual faculty is in him more highly developed than in the 
case of the psychic man, in whom perhaps it manifests itself 
only occasionally and fitfully. I think now, having pointed out 
the necessity for making a distinction between those two words, it 
is not necessary that I should comment on every remark that has 
been made in reference to this Paper; it would take me too long a 
time. Thereis one more remark that I must notice. It is the objec- 
tion that was made to my use of the word “ evolved.” I spoke of 
the sense of duty, whether psychic or pneumatic, being evolved. I 
meant what was evolved was a potential sense of duty. The sense, 
unless its exercise be called forth, is latent, and the calling forth 
of that sense into some kind of action is what I mean by its being 
evolved. The sense of duty being evolved (that is, a peculiarly 
human sense of duty), in the exercise of that we arrive at an ever- 
widening conception of the scope of duty, and that which develops 
our views on that subject, that which brings out and unfolds the 
true principles of Deontology, is a reverential conception of the 
ideaily perfect character. (Applause.) 
The Meeting then adjourned. 
FURTHER REPLY BY THE AUTHOR. 
The interpretation I have given of the title of my Paper is 
based on the assumption, not that the conception of duty is 
separable from that of binding or obligation, but that the latter 
presupposes something in regard to which deficiency would be 
predicable on the supposition of its being unfulfilled. In short, in 
contemplating any requirement, be it moral or physical, I perceive 
a concept which, as it seems to me, necessarily underlies the 
notion of constraint. Between needs and binds there is no obvious 
relation in respect to meaning, and although in Greek they are 
represented by the same sound and the same combination of 
letters, no such coincidence as this would justify the assumption 
of etymological identity. Yet, if an etymological connection 
between the two concepts were established, I should hold that the 
former is the primary signification of the impersonal ée?. In 
any case I classify the word with oportet (opus), il faut, &c. Thus 
