ea 
method of inductive logic, we must recur to the correct 
principles of rational psychology. In the Hxamination of the 
Sensualistic Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century (pp. 265, 272) 
it was shown that the deductive syllogism could be success- 
fully defended against the famous criticism of Locke and his 
followers, only by recognising the necessary @ priori and 
intuitive judgments of the reason as first premises. Locke 
had objected, that since the syllogism is confessed to be 
faulty which concludes more in its third proposition than is 
contained in its premises, no syllogism can establish any 
truth not known before. It must, then, be either sophistical 
or useless. In dissolving this objection, it was granted that 
it would have real force if the mind is entitled to hold no 
general propositions except the empirical ones derived from 
mere observation. But admit that the mind is entitled to 
other judgments than the empirical,—to the intuitive, namely, 
—and that they are universal, and the way appears m which 
the synthesis of propositions becomes a valid and fruitful 
source of new knowledge. 
A similar foundation must be found for the inductive reason- 
ing. The sensualistic psychology cannot furnish it. Hence 
the inconsistencies of Mr. Muill’s treatise on the Inductive 
Logic, at once the most incorrect and the most correct which 
has appeared, combining the truest insight into the inductive 
problem with the clearest contradictions of himself. The 
theory that all valid judgments are empirical must be sur- 
rendered ; the intuitive and primitive judgments of the reason 
must be recognised, as immediately giving us truths which 
are not only valid, but necessary and universal. Among 
these are the all-important axioms,—that every effect must 
proceed out of some efficient cause: that the concrete efficient 
contains power to produce the effect: that the same efficient 
cause, other conditions remaining, must produce the same 
effect. The theory of inductive demonstration to be asserted, 
then, is the following [which will commend itself sufficiently, 
in the absence of those details of discussion, which are forbidden 
by the limits of an essay | :— 
Permanent properties, or attributes of the things in nature, 
are potential powers, or energies, which become actual when 
the suitable relations are established between them and other 
properties or potential energies. 
A regular law of nature is nothing else than the expression 
of the presence of an efficient cause. Its regularity is the 
immediate consequence of the self-evident judgment, “ Like 
causes, like effects.””. The problem is to discover, not the 
“‘ physical cause,” or the ‘conditional cause or causes,” or 
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