25 
definition of the inductive demonstration, then, can be sub- 
stantiated, it will give to logic the inestimable advantage of 
reconciling and simplifying its departments. The review of 
opinions given by us at the outset revealed this state of facts : 
that logicians felt, on the one hand, that no reasoning process 
could be conclusive, unless it could be shown to conform, 
somehow, to syllogism; and on the other, that the custom 
and fashion of distinguishing induction from deduction as 
different, or even opposite, kinds of argument, had become 
prevalent, if not irresistible. Consequently, the most of 
them, following the obscure hints of their leader, Aristotle, 
endeavoured to account for induction as a different species of 
syllogism, in which we conclude from the some to the all, 
instead of concluding from the universal to the particular or 
the individual.’ And then immediately they were compelled, 
by the earliest and simplest maxims of their logic, to admit 
that such syllogisms are inconclusive! And they have to 
confess this in the face of this fact: that this induction is the 
organon of nearly all the sciences of physics and natural 
history; sciences whose results are so splendid, and so im- 
portant to human progress! Such a result is not a little 
mortifying and discreditable to philosophy. But we hope to 
show that it is a needless result. It will appear that induc- 
tion is not only syllogistic, and therefore within the pale of 
demonstrative argumentation, but regularly and lawfully 
_ syllogistic. Mill has had a sufficiently clear conviction of the 
necessity of accomplishing this, to teach (vol. 1., pp. 362— 
365) that the conclusions of this species of reasoning can only 
become solid when grounded in a universal truth. This, he 
thinks, is our belief in the invariability of the law of causa- 
tion. But he then (p. 345) very inconsistently adds, that 
this universal truth itself is but a wider induction, which 
approaches universal certainty sufficiently near, by reason of 
its breadth. This universal and necessary truth, we hope to 
show, is the intuition of cause for every effect, along with the 
truths involved therein. » 
To effect this, the methods of induction must be explained. 
When we speak of observed sequences, we mean a set of 
observed, resembling cases where one state or change seems 
immediately to precede another change, or “ effect,’ which 
we are studying. These cases may be observed by ourselves, 
or witnessed to us by others. The fact of the sequence is the 
only material thing. But, first, one’s own observation must 
be honest and clear, and his record of the case exact. He 
must not see his hypothesis in the facts, but only what occurs 
there. And, second, a case taken on testimony should be 
