26 
know) : in the first case, the cause of X must have been either 
A or B or C, or some combination of them. Why? Because 
it is a universal @ priori truth that there is no effect without 
a cause. This step thrown into a formal syllogism will be :— 
1. No effect can arise without a cause. 
2. But X arose preceded only by A+B+C; 
Therefore A or B or C, or some combination of them, must 
be cause of X. 
So, we prove that, in the second case, A+ D+H, and in 
the third, A+F+G, must have caused X. But next we 
construct another syllogism :— 
1. A cause must be present at the rise of the effect (immediate 
corollary from the intuition of power and efficiency in cause). 
2. B and C were absent in the second and third cases ; 
D and E were absent in the first and third cases; F and G 
were absent in the second and third cases, while yet X was 
always present ; 
Therefore, none of these, but only A was cause of X each 
time. 
Thus, by the successive examination of all the methods of 
induction, it is shown that they are all virtually syllogistical. 
The simple and satisfactory conclusion is thus reached, which 
unifies our theory of logic, and which also secures for careful 
and sufficient inductions that apodeictic character which is so 
essential to make them scientific propositions, and which we 
yet saw denied to them by so many great logicians. Induc- 
tion and deduction are not two forms of reasoning, but one 
and the same. The demonstrative induction is but that 
species of syllogism which, getting its minor premise from 
observed sequences of facts, gets its major premise from the 
intuition of cause. - 
{tis to be lamented that Mr. Mill, after teaching so much 
valuable truth, and displaying so just an insight up to this 
point, should then assert a view of our universal judgment of 
cause, which, if true, would destroy his own science. He 
believes, after the perverse metaphysic of his father, Mr. 
James Mill, and of the school of Hume, that the mind has no 
such universal « priori judgments. He believes that our 
general judgment of cause is itself empirical, and is gotten 
simply by combining a multitude of inductions enwmerationis 
simplicis. But these, he admits, are not demonstrative ; and 
the whole and sole use of all the canons of induction is to lead 
from these invalid colligations to certain truths. And he has 
confessed that this is only done by assuming the universal 
law of cause; so that his conception of the whole inductive 
logic is of a process which assumes its own conclusion as its 
