29 
principles which lie at the root of these processes, and which 
we have already stated, are either necessary laws of thought, 
or necessary laws of nature.’ 
Hamilton and his German teacher, Esser, here do two things, 
one of which is right and the other is wrong. They utterly 
refute Mill’s attempt to ground an apodeictic induction on his 
false metaphysic as to man’s primitive judgment. Thisis the 
right thing. They also deny to the inductive logic all 
apodeictic character. This is their wrong teaching. Surely 
this conclusion is as much against common sense and the 
universal practical convictions of mankind, as it is against 
their experience. Men assuredly believe that they have a 
multitude of certain demonstrated inductions. They are right 
in believing so. On these practical inductions, simple and 
brief in their processes it may be, yet real inductions, men are 
proceeding with absolute confidence, in their business, every 
day of their lives. It is by an induction that we all know we 
shall die. Does any man think his own death only a high 
probability? All know death is certain.* Here are all the 
modern triumphs of physical science, which civilised mankind 
regard as much their assured possession as the pure proposi- 
tions of geometry. No one regards their laws as of only 
probable truth. The world entrusts its wealth, health, life, to 
them with absolute faith. But most of the laws of physics 
are truths of induction. MHamilton’s conclusion, then, while 
right in denying a foundation for their certainty where Mill 
and his predecessors propose to place it, in the uniformities of 
nature, is wrong in allowing to the inductive logic only 
probable force. He, like the rest, overlooked too much the 
concern which our primary judgment of causation has in these 
processes. They did not correctly apprehend the relation of 
this great intuition to them. It is humbly claimed that, in 
explaining that relation by means of a rigid and exhaustive 
analysis of the inductive methods, this branch of logic has 
been reconciled with itself, and with the practical convictions 
of mankind. Its complete exploits of proof are discriminated 
from its incomplete ones. The former are lifted out of their 
uncertainty, to the prerogative of the syllogism, by showing 
that they do not conclude from some to all; but from a 
universal and necessary judgment to particulars and individuals. 
Why should it be thought a strange thing that this primary 
judement should be found to hold so fundamental a place at 
the very corner-stone of the sciences? ‘The farther philosophy 
is rightly pursued, the more is the unique importance of this 
* That is, humanly speaking.—Ep, 
