DABNEY. 30 
explanation of that stability, which he has necessitated us to 
expect in the laws of the second causes by which he designs to 
effectuate those ends. Or else, the alternative explanation 
must be, that the causal ties in physical sequences are eternal 
and necessary, essentially immanent in the very being of the 
material bodies acting and acted on, and this is fatalism. Let 
the Huxleys and Comtes, then, choose betwen this absolute 
fatalism and the doctrine of final causes. They have no other 
alternative. 
THE APODEICTIC INDUCTION. 
In concluding this exposition, then, it is necessary to re- 
mark on the looseness and confusion which have prevailed 
in the use of the term “ induction,” as of the word ‘‘analogy.”’ 
1. Sometimes the mere colligation of resembling cases has been 
called induction. 2. Sometimes the name has been given to 
the mere tentative inference from the some of the observed 
cases to the all, including the unobserved. 38. Sometimes it 
has been used to describe what is in reality no process of argu- 
ment at all, but the mere formulating in a single proposition 
of a class of observed facts, as when, having seen by inspec- 
tion a given predication true of each and every individual 
separately, we predicate it of the class. Thus Hamilton, more 
than once. 4. But the inductive demonstration is wholly 
another and a higher matter. It is the valid inference of a 
law of nature, from observed instances of sequence, by apply- 
ing to them a universal necessary judgment, as premise, the 
intuition of cause for every effect. It has been often said, as 
by Grote’s Aristotle, for instance, that induction is a different 
process from syllogism, and is, in fact, preliminary thereto ; 
that induction prepares the propositions from which syllogism 
reasons. ‘This is true of that induction, abusively so-called, 
which we have just numbered first and third. It is not true 
of inductive demonstration. It has usually been assumed 
that while induction is a species of reasoning, it is a different, 
and even an opposite species from deduction. The first and 
third actions of the mind, abusively called inductions, do, 
indeed, differ from deduction ; but they are not argumentative 
processes at all; they do not lead to new truth, either inwards 
or downwards. They merely formulate in general terms, or 
in general propositions, individual precepts or individual 
judgments already attained. True induction, or inductive 
demonstration, is simply one department of syllogistic reason- 
ing, and is as truly deductive as the rest of syllogism ; giving 
us, namely, those deductions which flow from the combination 
VOL. XIX. D 
