4] 
creative Mind voluntarily regulates its creative and providen- 
tial actions. Now, as we saw, the conclusion from an induc- 
tion is not demonstrated, unless the instances collected pre- 
clude all other probable, and even possible, hypotheses. Here 
is the other hypothesis, not only probable and intrinsically 
reasonable, but, in the ight of other arguments, certain—the 
theistic one: that the reason why the vital energies wrought 
in paleontologic creatures in a way analogous to the way they 
work now is, that the same God created and governed then, 
and that he sees good reasons for following, in the different 
ages, similar types of working. It might be conceded that 
the analogies under discussion, if viewed alone, would be in- 
sufficient to prove the existence and action of a God. Yet 
they do suffice to show that solution a probable one. This 
alone is enough to prove the evolutionist conclusion invalid. 
The argument, then, is not a demonstrative induction. Here 
our logical criticism might stop. But it will be instructive to 
show how it is confirmed by the positive refutation which other 
laws and facts of natural history inflict upon the evolution 
theory. This is excluded, as a tenable explanation of the 
organised universe, by the following instances, which do have, 
what the previous analogies have not, an application in strict 
accordance with the principles of induction. 
1. No existing species has displayed a particle of tendency 
towards the change in a single truly specific attribute, within 
the longest period of human history. The mummies, as well 
as the effigies, of the living creatures associated with the 
oldest Heyptian remains, were found by Cuvier and by Kunth 
specifically identical with the same creatures now existing in 
Egypt. Researches into antiquity have everywhere led to 
the same result. Now, if evolution of one species from 
another is to be inductively proved, some instances at least 
tending to the result must be adduced. The fact that all 
human knowledge through three or four thousand years pre- 
sents no approach to a single instance, is fatal. 
2. In paleontology, each species, so far as known from its 
fossils, has remained absolutely fixed during the continuance 
of its period. Itis very true, that a species may be found in 
a subsequent cosmical period, showing resemblances to, and 
improvements on, a given extinct species of the previous 
cosmical period. But this fact makes nothing for evolution, 
because science shows that there has been, between the two 
periods and their two sets of living creatures as two wholes, 
a clear breach, interrupting the natural and regular forces of 
reproduction. The evolutionist must show some instance 
where, within the limits of some one cosmical period, a 
