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primary and inseparable quality of the nature itself. And 
this receives confirmation from the fact that no other impulse 
is capable of developing the moral, which is the highest side 
of our nature, into heroic virtue, or of adorning the life with 
all that is true, honourable, just, pure, lovely, and of good 
report. One in whom this excellence is found more nearly 
approaches the ideal of perfect manhood than any other. 
Consequently, the power by whose operation this state is pro- 
duced is most peculiarly and intensely human. But that 
power is a profound sense of responsibility in intense and 
continued operation. 
If we lookat the contrast,—that is, at a man who has no 
sense of responsibility, having suppressed every call to duty 
and all remembrance of benefits from others, and who now 
lives as though he were perfectly independent,—we see one 
without a motive to virtue, and who can only act in mere 
concert with others from some individual and temporary 
interest of selfishness. A family, a city, a nation of such 
isolated units is impossible ; and yet the family, the city, the 
nation, are integral and necessary parts of complete humanity. 
Union in purpose and work is impossible among individuals 
who have no sense of responsibility ; but without such united 
purpose and action no cultivation of the mind, no improve- 
ment in outward conditions, no perpetuation of the race, and 
no life,—but in the lowest barbarism and_ privation,—is 
possible. Such a state of things is not the intended, as it is 
not the actual, condition of humanity, but it is the necessary 
consequence of the existence of beings with our endowments 
without responsibility. Had such been created, it would have 
been impossible to awaken a sense of responsibility after- 
wards ; and, had it been possible, who possessed the right to 
interfere with the Creator’s work, and who could possibly have 
the inclination to impart such a gift to man? ‘Thus, by the 
necessity of nature, we are driven to the conclusion that man 
is liable to answer to his Maker for every endowment which 
has been committed to his trust. 
In discussing the question of Human Responsibility, we 
are bound to give all possible attention to the declarations of 
the divine will, and to all divine acts which have relation to 
this side of our nature. And this obligation arises from the 
fact that none can know the nature so well as its Author, and 
that He can have no purpose towards it but its improvement 
to the highest limits. Taking this as our rule of procedure 
and judgment, we cannot fail to see that, from the beginning, 
there has been a continual effort to awaken and perpetuate 
