THE ALLEGED SCEPTICISM OF KANT. 187 
never know positively the subject matter of faith. Every one will 
remember that there is a distinction, that is recognised in the 
teaching of our Lord between faith and knowledge, which 
embraces even the Bible itself in its application; and it is because 
very often, faith, or, at any rate, the tenets of faith have been 
presented by men as the object of positive knowledge to their 
fellow men, instead of realizing the distinction between matters of 
faith and knowledge, that faith has been rejected by those who 
understood not what Kant meant. It appears to me we have 
suffered very much from that. The only sermon I ever preached 
before the University of Oxford was upon that subject—the rela- 
tion of scientific knowledge to matters of faith and religion, and 
the true function, as I conceived it, of the mental attitude of faith. 
The additions that Dr. Courtney has made to the Kantian 
position are, I conceive, very important; and the light he has 
thrown on the subject from the history of religion, as well as from 
the theory of evolution, must help men, I think, in the direction of 
belief in God and in preparing the way for that moral ground 
which must be the ultimate source of our confidence and our hope. 
I sincerely trust that this paper will be widely noticed and that 1t 
will form the basis of, perhaps, more popular and simple teaching 
on this subject, such as shall induce men to rest their attitude on 
what we certainly conceive to be the true basis of faith when 
properly understood in its relation to other faculties of our complex 
mental nature. 
Professor H. Lanauorne Orcuarp, M.A., B. Se.—I think it has 
been shown that the position of Kant is not that of a sceptic, but 
that of a critic. His great merit, to my mind, is this—that he 
showed man to be not merely a psychological being, but also a 
moral being—that he treated man as a whole, instead of in the 
peculiar way in which many philosophers are accustomed to look 
at him. Kant assigned to the moral faculty in man the supreme 
department in man’s nature; that, I think, is the greatest benefit 
he rendered to philosophy. He did that not apparently on the 
mere ground that the moral faculty ought to be the highest, but 
because the judgments of the moral faculty rest on a surer basis 
than those of the logical faculty. Logic depends, for its conclusions, 
on its premises. If the premises are false, or even one of them be 
false, no amount of logical reasoning will lead toa true conclusion. 
The truths which the moral faculties give us rest on intuitions, 
O 
