190 W. L. COURTNEY, M.A., LL.D., ON 
previous cause. That is, in a sense, it is free in its action—it acts 
according to its own nature, and not according to any external 
circumstance. When the stone is set free it does not move 
according to the cause which set it free, but according to the 
eternal law of motion. Of course the cause which set it free, if it 
were an impulsive force, would, toa certain extent, modify its motion, 
but only in accordance with those laws. And so with human will. 
man does not act unless he has some 
I admit we act from motive 
motive, but when he is started into action he acts according to his 
own nature. So motive alone does not determine a man’s action, 
but motive combined with the nature of the man whe acts. 
The Cuarrman.—We shall be glad to hear any other speakers. 
Tf not I will ask Dr. Courtney to make his reply to his critics. 
The AurHor.—lI thank you very much for the courtesy with 
which you have received my remarks on a subject which is 
extremely difficult, and on which various opinions can be held. 
I was interested in what Mr. Robinson said in reference to hig 
opinion that Kant derived some of his views from the Philosophy 
of India. My own knowledge of that is extremely small and is 
derived solely from the books of Professor Max Miller, Sir Monier 
Williams and others. JI am aware that there is a parallel between 
that several learned Germans have traced or thonght that they 
have traced the origin of the early Greek Philosophy, both in 
India, Egypt and the Hast generally—for instance, Heraclitus 
fixed on fire as the origin of all matter from which the Parsees are 
supposed to have derived their belief. There is one thing that 
Mr. Robinson feels as much as I do. He stated in effect, that 
the great difference between a philosophy which says all is 
thought, and ends there, and a philosophy like Kant’s, is, that one is 
intended to lead us to action and the other not. It is obvious that 
a mere contemplative theory of the universe leads to the theory 
that all action is indifferent, and a philosophy of quietism, in 
consequence, ends much as Mr. Robinson has stated. The value of 
the doctrine of Kant is that, having told us how far thought 
should go, he then proceeds in another treatise to refer us to the 
whole sphere of moral action and effort, to save us from the effect 
of mere contemplation. There are one or two things that occur 
to me. If T may be allowed to refer to Professor Orchard’s 
remarks, he seems to assume that the argument I have referred 
