THEORIES OF NATURAL SELECTION AND DESIGN. 4o 



to this ; a second between organisms and their surround - 

 ino-s ; and a third between organs and their characteristic 

 functions. The facts are acknowledged. What we wish to 

 have is some proof that teleological relations like these are 

 possible without the intervention and guidance of intelligence 

 and will. It is granted by all, that varied and complex forces 

 must have been active in the origination of germs ; that the 

 metabolism natural to vitaHsed substance is limited; that 

 divergences take place among identical germs in identical 

 environments ; and that differentiations which are determined. 

 in growth, and which give vai^ieties temporary or permanent, 

 have never, to the knowledge of science, within the present 

 epoch resulted in transformism. But to credit all this to 

 '' natural selection,^' or to the notion of " unconscious ends,'' 

 or to the theory of " conditions of existence," is not flattering 

 either to science or to common sense. 



There are other aspects of this question well deserving 

 careful notice. As, for example, the allegation, that to let 

 species with all the fitnesses which accompany them drop out 

 of existence, and to introduce others closely related to them, 

 would be a great waste of power. But can there be waste of 

 power when the agent is omnipotent ? There is also the 

 common attempt to discredit the principle of design by hold- 

 ing it responsible for effects incidental to its action. Is the 

 dust raised by the rapid rotation of the wheels of the express 

 train a proof of blundering on the part of the mechanical 

 engineer who designed them ? Both topics admit of wide 

 discussion; but, without touching on them further, we conclude 

 with a re-statement of our leading positions in the following 

 paragraphs : — 



1. In observing phenomena and in registering facts the 

 desire to interpret them is natural and fundamental. We are 

 in the lines of true scientific work, both when we ask what is 

 their meaning and when we try to find it. We might look long 

 at an isolated fact, if we could find one, without even seeming 

 to leave science for philosophy. But there are no isolated 

 facts in nature. Relational dependencies meet us everywhere, 

 and it lies as much with science as with philosophy to take 

 this into account and to explain it. Now, if we find in the 

 relations of organisms to one another and to their environ- 

 ments, or even in the inter-dependence of the parts of 

 organisms, order and adaptations suggestive of corresponding 

 features resulting from human skill, it would not be philo- 

 sophical to resist the impression, that the natural fitnesses 

 may be as truly the products of thought or the outcome of 



