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MR. J. HASSELL 



most of our minds, I would refer to the singular difficulty that is found in 

 the endeavour to make one political party understand what the other means. 

 Now, this difficulty is, surely, not an intellectual one. There miist be some 

 action of the will involved in it ; and, although, of course, each of us is 

 profoundly convinced of the wilful obstinacy of the other party, neverthe- 

 less, I do think that these practical difficulties of every-day life furnish very 

 important commentaries on the greater and more vital question contained 

 in the paper wherein the author has so clearly treated a point of great 

 importance. I now trust that some of those present will give us the benefit 

 of their thoughts and suggestions on this subject. 



Mr. W. Griffith. — Perhaps I may be permitted to make a few remarks 

 on the able paper before us. I would first of all say that one of the difficulties 

 started by Mr. Herbert Spencer is due to the way in which he plays with 

 words, some of which he uses in more senses than one. For instance, I might 

 point out that a thing may be unknowable in one sense, and yet knowable in 

 another. We may not fully know the properties and attributes of each person 

 or thing we come in contact with, and yet, although unknowable in that 

 sense, either may be knowable so far as its existence is concerned. We are 

 well acquainted with the existence of many things in chemistry, and yet we 

 do not understand all the qualities impressed upon them, although as to the 

 fact that the things themselves do exist, that is perfectly knowable to all. 

 Therefore, I think Mr. Herbert Spencer may be to some extent correct when 

 he states that the attributes of power, goodness, and wisdom, are not fully 

 knowable or comprehensible ; though, at the same time, that is a very 

 different thing from saying that the existence of a Supreme Being is not 

 knowable ; because the existence of a thing may be knowable, although its 

 attributes and qualities are not. I must say that I do not quite agree with 

 those who say that the whole question is merely a matter of opinion, because 

 there are many facts we may adduce that prove the existence of the ijheno- 

 mena we witness. We may regard the universe around us, and those who 

 study the matter cannot fail to be convinced that it furnishes evidence of 

 design. If, then, there is design, there must have been a designer. If there 

 be a human soul with intelligence impressed on its faculties, there must of 

 necessity have been some power possessed of intelligence which implanted 

 that intelligence on our race. I think Mr. Herbert Spencer does, in one of 

 his later works, admit that there is something greater — something beyond the 

 universe which is distinct from matter — that there is, in fact, a great un- 

 knowable mind, though he is not able to understand and explain it, and 

 cannot express its limitations in words. I believe I am correct in stating 

 that in one of his later works this is so, and, if it be so, then the assertion 

 that that greater one is unthinkable has nothing in it, and, in reality, falls 

 to the ground. But the more serious part of the case (I speak as a barrister 

 from the brief which the author of the paper has provided me) is that the 

 young students mentioned by the author of the paper, and who it seems 

 must be taken as types of a large class, not only profess themselves unable 

 to understand what no one, Theist or Christian, professes himself fully able to 



