ON THE UNREASONABLENESS OF AGNOSTICISM. 79 



understand— the existence of the attributes of a Supreme Being — but they 

 also say they do not understand or comprehend the nature of responsibility. 

 This, certainly, is a very important matter, and if we can show that they are 

 in error we shall have made a great advance. It is useless for them to say 

 that general ideas of responsibility do not exist at the present day. The 

 existence of the law courts, the verdicts of juries, the sentences of the judges, 

 show that there is general responsibility which all must admit to exist. 

 There is responsibility under the common law, and it would be folly and 

 absurdity to say there is no responsibility of any kind. Perhaps, however, 

 they may say, " We do admit that ; but there our knowledge terminates." 

 This knowledge is certainly most important as far as it goes. Then we 

 would further answer our students in this way : " You admit a responsibility 

 recognised by law as to a great many duties, and you say the law enforces 

 them all. Ave there no duties beyond those which the law would enforce ? 

 Is there no such thing as gratitude, parental affection, filial affection ? and 

 do not these, in the existing relations of society, imply a certain responsibility 

 on the part of its different members, one towards the other ? " I really 

 cannot see what answer they can give to this question. They may say they 

 cannot understand all the grounds of responsibility ; but that they must 

 admit many grounds of responsibility do exist I can scarcely think will be 

 denied. Bishop Butler, in his Analor/y, compared the difficulties of reve- 

 lation with those found in the existing state of things, and showed that 

 such as were discernible in the one existed also in the other, and that, if 

 we are to be consistent, we must not only give up revelation and our belief 

 in supernatural causes, but we must also give up our belief in the analogy 

 of existing facts, and in natural religion, which obtains amongst all societies 

 and races of men. If this were to be the case, what, I ask, would be the 

 result ? It would be found in a complete chaos of thought, which has only 

 to be mentioned in order to show its absurdity. There is no doubt that in 

 the ordinary course of life we do get evidence which is not strictly 

 mathematical and only amounts to probability ; but, unless we act on 

 probabilities in our customary business, that business could not be carried on. 

 We are never sure of all our facts. We form an idea of what is most 

 probable, and begin, to act accordingly. If we were to act in reference to 

 divine things in the same way as we do in human matters, we should see 

 that we were no more unreasonable in the one than in the other. If persons 

 will only consider the evidence put before them fairly, candidly, and im- 

 partially, they will see that there is sufficient evidence as to liability here 

 and retribution hereafter, and upon that evidence they ought to act. 



Mr. H. Cadman Jones. — The reference made to Mr. Herbert Spencer 

 in page 64 gives, I think, an idea that may be worked out to some 

 advantage. We may admit his proposition that the human mind cannot 

 form an adequate conception of the universe as a whole, and that "we 

 cannot conceive in its real form and magnitude even that small segment of 

 the globe which extends a hundred miles on each side of us, mu(;h less the 



G 2 



