177 



ORDINARY MEETING, Febeuaey 1, 1886. 



The Right. Hon. A. S. Ayeton in the Chair. 



The Minutes of the last Meeting were read and confirmed, and the 

 following paper was read by the author : — 



THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS OF AGNOSTI- 

 CISM EXAMINED IN THE COURT OF PURE 

 REASON. By the Rev. H. J. Clarke.* 



KNOWLEDGE is the perception of relations. Au 

 experience, it is true^ may be conceived as a sensation, 

 considered simply and purely as such ; but to regard it as 

 amounting to knowledge is to assume that the subject of it 

 recognises^ to say the least, in an act of consciousness, that the 

 sensation is his own, — namely^ perceives it relatively to himself. 

 In the case supposed he has a kind of knowledge which is as 

 direct and immediate as it is possible to conceive ; but, 

 evidently, it is not strictly speaking absolute. What he 

 hnoivs in respect to the sensation never transcends relations 

 between it and other things, even though we should assume 

 these to be but indispensable conditions of his consciousness. 

 In giving an account or description of it he can frame no 

 proposition which does more than indicate some out of all the 

 relations which are conceivable, or does less than point in 

 some way to himself. If he says that he finds it agreeable or 

 painful, as the case may be, he merely represents it as having 

 excited personal inclination, or, on the contrary, aversion. If 

 he expresses himself moi-e specifically he does but direct 

 attention to further relations by which, whether regard be had 

 to environment or not, it is still connected with states and 

 conditions of personal experience. The things between which 

 relation is perceived may be themselves relations, and of the 



* Vicar of Great Barr, Author of The Fimdammtal Science. 

 VOL. XX. 



