198 REV. H. J. CLARKE ON ASSUMPTIONS OP AGNOSTICISM. 



the first cause ; no inevitable " Antinomies," no irreconcileable conclusions 

 arrived at by diverse routes of legitimate argument constrain us to confess 

 that it is unknowable, but that, as regards the possibility of scientific recog- 

 nition, it is for us, to say the least, as favourably situated as assumed second 

 causes, giving, ^as second causes, if assumed, appear to give — evidence of 

 characteristics, and, equally with them, accounting for experiences which, 

 to some extent and under suitable conditions, admit of being foreseen and 

 predicted. Whatever be the cause assumed for any experience, and however 

 near imagination may bring it, no scientific recognition of it, more immediate 

 than is presupposed in warrantable inferences from experienced effects, finds 

 place within the sphere of the human intellect. All evidences of existence 

 hint at more than we are permitted to know, but at the same time they 

 involve the possibility of arriving in respect to it at real knowledge. This 

 is my position. It will be seen that I fully agree with Kant that " all 

 synthetical principles of the understanding are applicable immanently only, 

 i.e., within its own sphere" {Critique of Pure Reason, trans, by Max 

 Miiller, vol. ii. p. 546), but that I have given reasons for dissenting from 

 his assumption that the human understanding transcends its proper sphere 

 in attempting synthesis in the region of supersensuous experience, and that 

 the only cognizable law of causality is that which links together phenomenal 

 changes. If these reasons are valid, it follows that a philosophical system 

 which forbids the ascription of plan, purpose, or character to the Funda- 

 mental Cause, and limits the concept to that of an Infinite Something, is a 

 system of gratuitous negations, rests on no true philosophical basis, and 

 breaks down of its own weight. 



