ON MJEACLE.S. 211 



by Him is truly^ and not merely apparently^ a supernatural 

 event, and is readily conceivable. 



A man dies, the natural consequent of death is decay. But 

 God intervenes, and death is followed not by decay but by 

 life. The consequent of A is a, but after A, B intervenes, 

 and h, not a, follows. Let A stand for an iron ball thrown into 

 the air, and a for its return to earth. Let B stand for human 

 action exerted to suspend the ball in the air, and h for its 

 suspension. The condition supposed above is fulfilled. Let 

 A stand for man's death, and a for the decay of the dead 

 body ; let B stand for Divine action, and h for restoration to 

 life. The analogy between human and Divine action is complete. 



As there is no difficulty in supposing or imagining the one 

 case, so there should be no difficulty in supposing or imagining 

 the other case. 



That which human action is in relation to ordinary 

 occurrences, that is Divine action in relation to extraordinary 

 occurrences. A miracle, therefore, is not impossible; that 

 is, it is not inconsistent with the Divine attributes. 



Mill sums up the dispute on this point between Paley 

 and Hume in a lucid and cogent way, and with his word^ 

 I will dismiss this part of my argument, and proceed to the 

 consideration of the second main objection to miracles. 



He says {Logic, vo\. ii., 167-8, ed. 8) : — 



" In the case of an alleged miracle it is asserted that the 

 effect was defe^.ted, not in the absence, but in consequence, 

 of a counteracting cause, namely, a direct interposition of an 

 act of will of some Being who has power over nature ; and 

 in particular of a Being whose will being assumed to havo? 

 endowed all the causes with the power by which they 

 produ.ce these effects, may well be supposed able to 

 counteract them.'^ "A miracle (as was justly remarked by 

 Brown) is no contradiction to the law of cause and effect ; it 

 is a new effect, supposed to be produced by the introduction 

 of a new cause ; of the adequacy of that cause if present 

 there can be no doubt ; the only antecedent improbability 

 which can be ascribed to a miracle is the improbability that 

 any such cause existed. All, therefore, that Hume has 

 made out, and this he must be considered to have made out, 

 is that .... no evidence can prove a miracle to any one 

 who did not previously believe in the existence of a being 

 or beings with supernatural power ; or who believes himself 

 to have full proof that the character of the Being whom he 

 recognises is inconsistent with his having seen fit to interfere 

 on the occasion in question." 



q 2 



