ON MIEACLES. 217 



could be proved by testimony. In the interests of mankind, 

 therefore, the principle, as explained above, must be rejected. 



But it is possible that Hume did not intend his objection 

 to be so interpreted. Whether he wished to take advantage of 

 the ambiguity pointed out by Whately may be doubtful; but 

 it is probable that he did. For the tone of his essay is highly 

 objectionable, — concluding, as it does, with a sneer. The 

 ambiguity is, of course, in the use of the term " testimony.-" If 

 the objection urged cannot mean that all testimony is more 

 likely to be false than a miracle to be true, then we must 

 impose upon it the common-sense limitation suggested by 

 Whately, and read it thus : — It is more likely that some testi- 

 mony will be false. Such a proposition would be perfectly 

 correct and exceedingly valuable. It is more likely that some 

 persons will be deceived, or will attempt to deceive, than 

 a miracle will occur. We act upon this principle every day. 

 If a person come with a story bordering on the supernatural, 

 we, unless in very exceptional circumstances, quietly put his 

 story aside, as unlikely to be true. We assume that it is more 

 likely that some mistake has occurred, than the miraculous 

 event. But there may be cases of such tremendous import- 

 ance, where the witnesses are so exceptional that we cannot 

 do this. In such cases we investigate, take evidence, cautiously 

 weigh its import, and decide according to the evidence. 



The principle teaches us not to reject all testimony, but 

 to carefully sift and weigh it in cases of importance. Hume 

 describes the case of a miracle in relation to testimony as 

 a contest of improbabilities. It is improbable that a miracle 

 has occurred; it is improbable that ten or twelve intelligent, 

 honest men have been themselves deceived, or have conspired 

 together to deceive others. Which is the more improbable 

 case ? A miracle involves the suspension of the ordinary 

 laws of nature. Is this probable ? The improbability is 

 exactly measured by Paley in the '^Introductory Remarks ^^ 

 to his Evidences. Antecedent to all evidence, the degree in 

 which it is probable, or improbable, that the Author of Nature 

 would make a revelation of His will to mankind, is the measure 

 of the probability or the improbability of a miraculous occur- 

 rence. Suppose this condition, and that twelve men, capable 

 and honest, testify that they witnessed a suspension of the 

 laws of nature by one who claimed to be a teacher sent from 

 God; — Is it probable they are lying, or are under a delusion ? 



