ON MIRACLES. 231 



contradiction and confusion. And this confusion is increased by the fact 

 that the laws of matter are to a great extent ascertained ; the laws of mind, 

 on the contrary, very slightly ascertained ; while the laws of will can hardly 

 be said to have been ascertained at all. "With regard to the rest of the 

 paper, its arguments seem just, although I should myself have been inclined 

 to put theui iu a different form. Thus it seems to me that all nature is 

 kept in being by a play of counteracting forces. If I throw a ball up into 

 the air, the first law of motion tells me that it would, if left alone, go on for 

 ever in a straight line ; but the action of gravitation, and the resistance of 

 the atmosphere, soon bring it into a state of relative rest. Spiritual forces 

 are unknown forces ; and if spiritual needs involve the necessity of inter- 

 ferences with the ordinary course of this world, spiritual forces will act 

 when required, modifying without destroying the action of the rest. The 

 objection in page 215 seems to refute itself. If we are to accept the general 

 uniformity of law on the ground of testimony, it seems to me that we are 

 bound to admit the occurrence of occasional departures from that uniformity 

 on the same ground. The same principle that excludes miracles on the ground 

 that they are opposed to the general course of things, as witnessed to by 

 mankind, would equally exclude the possibility of all strange or unusual 

 events and all new discoveries. Testimony deals with facts ; science with 

 their explanation. But it is impossible for science to lay down a -priori 

 axioms that there are not, and cannot be, forces which lie outside the 

 ordinary range of man's perceptions. When science leaves dealing with 

 facts, and proceeds to postulate impossibilities, she has destroyed herself. 

 Hume's canon, quoted on p. 216, is a remarkable instance of the ambiguity 

 of language. Taken literally, it is incontrovertible. It is unlikely that a 

 miracle should happen. If it were likely, the occurrence would be no 

 miracle. And, therefore, it is ' likely ' that the testimony concerning it is 

 false. But is it more than ' likely ' ? Has Hume, keen as he is, con- 

 founded ' likely ' with certain ? For there is testimony of such a kind that 

 it is sufficient to overthrow the greatest amount of unlikeliness. And 

 the peculiar and varied evidence which sustains the actual occurrence of 

 the miracles of Christ is evidence of this kind. The scope of Mr. Watson's 

 paper does not enable him to enter into this evidence. But, as a matter of 

 fact, a large part of the case for the Christian miracles is the altogether 

 unique character of the evidence by which it is supported, and the immense 

 cumulative force of converging arguments of all kinds. This, however, is a 

 question into which I cannot enter, it being outside the province of the 

 Victoria Institute. But I may be allowed to say that it is a view of the 

 case which is often overlooked by the defenders, and invariably ignored by 

 the opponents, of Christianity." 



A third communication is from the Rev. Prebendary Eow, M.A., who 

 dissents from the author's mode of putting his arguments, which he does not 

 consider forcible enough. 



