ON FINAL CAUSE. 269 



go back to so elementary a imitter as the causes which Aristotle classed 

 as first causes. And yet there are few things which create so much discussion 

 as the question of first cause. I once heard a distinguished lawyer ask a 

 distinguished physician, in cross-examination, what was the cause of a 

 man's illness, and the physician replied, " If you will tell me what you mean 

 by 'cause,' I will answer the question." The lawyer, however, thought 

 better of it, and the question was not answered ; and we were consequently 

 cheated out of a very important discussion. Doubtless, the barrister was 

 astute enough to know that most men would have fallen into the trap he 

 had laid, and, in describing the cause of the man's illness, have aff'orded 

 a chance for a clever rejoinder. And so it is in the matter before us. We 

 see men entirely ignoring the very ancient distinction between the diff'erent 

 causes by confusing, under the common term " causes," all those which 

 Aristotle, if not the first to draw attention to, was undoubtedly the first to 

 classify. The more we pursue the question the more evident it is that, take 

 what view Ave may of creation, whether we consider the present state of 

 things to have been brought about by evolution, or by a mere single act of 

 creation, we are just as much unable to escape from the argument of 

 final cause in the one case as in the other. We are, in fact, unable to free 

 our minds from the belief that there has been a distinct purpose in nature. 

 It is, I believe, perfectly true that there is nothing in the belief in evolution 

 to prevent a full and complete belief in a final power and creative cause, 

 though I quite share the author's view of the very incomplete proof of the 

 universality of evolution. Therefore, this question of final cause is by no 

 means one which it is needless to discuss in these days. It is not one, I 

 think, which has been so thoroughly thrashed out that there is no necessity 

 to say any more upon it. There are, however, many here who I believe 

 are well able to discuss the subject, and I hope they will give us the benefit of 

 their thoughts upon it. 



Mr. Hastings C. Dent, O.E., F.L.S. — In offering a few remarks on this 

 subject, I would first of all say that there have been few papers read in 

 this room to which I have listened with deeper interest ; and 1 cannot but 

 regard it as a most important contribution to the transactions of this Society. 

 I propose to confine my remarks to a few criticisms, and I may say that there 

 are many points in the paper which are so very clear and plain that I might 

 almost call them axioms. I will draw attention to some half dozen of these, 

 and the first to which I would refer relates to contrivance and choice. In 

 section 2, the author says, " Wherever nature presents us with structures, 

 and especially organs, adapted to natural ends, there has been contrivance, 

 and also choice of the physical means so adapted. But contrivance and 

 choice are functions of thought and will, such as are performed only by some 

 rational persons." There is a very admirable illustration of this given 

 in section 7. It is not the old idea of Paley about the watch, but 

 rather an enlargement of that idea. The author says, "Here the blind force 

 of gravity is caused to realise an end so unlike its usual physical effects in 

 the fall of hail-stones and rain-drops, of leaves and decayed branches." 



