'■""■Ki'i] s()i']iii)i.(i(iY cr.xxxv 



Aristotle seems to lm\'e considered force iis tin- |)i'iii];il iirop- 

 eity from which all other pi-operties are derived, for thus I 

 interpret his doctrine of energ'y. Certain it is that since his 

 time there have been metaphysicians who have held this doc- 

 trine. Perhaps this eiTor has more w'idely prevailed than any 

 iloctrine of the g-enesis of the essentials. Aristotle's theor\- of 

 mind is vague, and his reader may easilv defend the jaoposi- 

 tion that he derives (uieru'V from minrl. rather than miiul fr<im 

 energy. 



Spencer resolves extension into force, and impliedh , though 

 not overtly, resolves duration into force in his discussion of the 

 doctrine of evolution; and finally he resolves mind into fon-e; 

 so that Spencer is the modern champion of this theorx. Of 

 course Spencer does not consider tin; derivation to he parental 

 genesis, but genesis by evolution. The American pliilo.sopher 

 of this school .Ml' f. ester F. W'ai'd. also deri\('s im'nd from 

 force bv evolution. 



Still other philosophers have taught that pei'sistence is the 

 primal i)ro})erty from w^liich all others are derived. This phi- 

 losophy has been taught as a reification of being, and is known 

 as ontology. The term "being" signifies existence, hut it is also 

 used in Aryan languages as the common asserter. 'I'liis (h(ul)le 

 use has always been found in ontology. The prevalent phi- 

 losophy of medieval time was ontology. Being is not held to 

 be the father of properties, but ratliei- the sul).strate. 



Idealism is the doctrine that the other [)roperties are jjro- 

 duced by mind, the foundation of wdiich is consciousness. It 

 began with Berkelev and has been elaboratelv ftirnndated in 

 the German of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. .Mind is 

 reified, and the physical world has its genesis in the human 

 mind, or, as some think, in the mind of God who endowed tlie 

 human mind with faculties to think his thoughts as he tlKtuyht 

 them in ci'eation. The physical world is thus au illusion called 

 phenomenon, the reality being noumencjn or thought. Two 

 schools of idealists ai'e found; one speaks of noumenon as 

 mind, the other as will. In one school mind is the onh' sub- 

 stance, in the other will is the only substance. 



The essentials with their relations, quantities, projierties, 



