THE SCOVE OF MIND. 251 



it necessary to state t.lieni as tentative and novel simply 

 because the bulk, not alone of metaphysicians but psycholo- 

 gists, have undoubtedly held that mind is consciousness. 

 Some using, as we have seen, a " wide" sense, have included 

 under the term states that may become conscious if 

 sufficient attention is directed to them. But to talk of 

 unconscious mind Avas distinctly held to be a contradiction in 

 terms, and even the unconscious cerebration of the lirain, 

 Avhicli is now nearly universally acknowledged, was con- 

 sidered as late as 187G a most objectionable doctrine. 



Professor Lazarus says* : " We have first of all to re- 

 member that our psychic life is made up of conscious and 

 unconscious elements. We think of consciousness as a 

 brightly illuminated space surrounded with widely extended 

 darkness, with the dim elements, though outside conscious- 

 ness, co-operating with those Avithin in a state of co-vibra- 

 tion." 



The testimony of physiology is as follows: '"The facts of 

 physiology have at length led psychologists to see that 

 states of consciousness form only a portion of the mental life, 

 and have as background sub-consciousness and unconscious- 

 ness. At first it seems like a contradiction to speak of facts 

 of unconsciousness as belonging to psychology ; but when it 

 is considered that the same changes in the nervous system 

 may be accompanied by consciousness, or some sub-conscious 

 change, it is evident that mind must consist of other elements 

 than those which appear in consciousness. The study of 

 physiology was necessary to bring out clearly the conception 

 of imconscious feelings as facts in mental phenomena. "t 



Again, "'The metaphysical view that mind and conscious- 

 ness form an indivisible unity will not harmonize Avith the 

 facts of physiology ; for Avhole tracts may be cut out of the 

 territory of intellectual consciousness Avithout interfering 

 Avitli the integrity of consciousness, and Avill may bo abolished 

 Avhile consciousness remains."! 



We Avill now sum up the CA^idence in tlie Avords of Bastian: 

 " If Ave are, as so many pliilosophers tell us, to regard the 

 sphere of mind as co-extensive Avith the sphere of conscious- 

 ness, we shall find mind reduced to a mere imperfect disjointed 

 series of agglomerations of feelings, and conscious states of 



* Das Lt'hen ties Sedu, Professor Lazaru.s in JfiiuL vol. vii, |i. Tj!);). 

 t T. White in Mind, vol. vi, j). 5()(;. 

 I Functions of Brain, Ferrier. 



