THE SCOPE OF MINI). 255 



It is owing- to the first of these faults, the faihii'e to distinguish 

 between consciousness and self-consciousness, that many actions 

 are described as automatic which we perform habitually withour, 

 as we express it, thinking about them. Thus we are not conscious 

 of tlie rapid and easy operation of our minds in the movement of 

 oar limbs in walking, and in the movements of the various organs 

 of speech in the formation of the different sounds which go to 

 make up words. We often, indeed, take no note of numbers of 

 the words themselves as we speed them, each in proper place, to 

 express an idea which touches us so slightly that it is forgotten 

 tlie moment after. Yet we were once painfully conscious of the 

 small details which have long since become so easy as to escape 

 the introspective glance. Moreover, the same sequence of events 

 is observed in actions to which persons become habituated at 

 periods long after infancy and childhood are gone ; for example, 

 many movements of the hands in manufacturing and in music. 

 When Dugald Stewart accounted for these things by pointino- out 

 that attention was necessary for memory, and time necessary foi- 

 attention, he Avas surely nearer the truth than are the modern 

 scientists who call them automatic. Had he lived a little later, ho 

 might have spoken of the attention requi]-ed for noting a conscious 

 act as self-consciousness. 



But there are things in the histoiy of mind to which my 

 second criticism applies, viz., that Ave must distinguish between a 

 conscious factor and our own consciousness. Thus, we talk of 

 voluntary movements, and yet it is the fact that in performing in 

 accordance with the dictates of our wills the simplest of these we 

 are utterly unconscious of the existence of the different muscles 

 brought into pla}'. If we depended on our knowledge of muscles, 

 nerves, and brain to bring them into operation in carrying out our 

 conscious decrees, the longest lifetime would not suffice to raise 

 the most distinguished anatomist or physiologist up from his bed. 

 Yet it is not to be believed that these movements are accomplished 

 by other than conscious poAver. 



Let me give another example of the evidence of what Dr. 

 ♦Schofield, following others, considers as psychic force Avithout 

 consciousness, but Avhich I am constrained to refer to a conscious 

 PoAver beyond the sphere of our OAvn consciousness. We come 

 — our minds come — whence ? We note, as dcA'elopment proceeds, 

 the close connection between mind and brain. We follow the 



