366 



EELIGION 



Ib. a. e. 



educated people among ourselves, can not 

 be considered as due to any physical ef- 

 fect, while among primitive tribes they 

 may be so viewed. The same is true of 

 certain mythological concepts. If an In- 

 dian tribe explains the markings on the 

 skin of the chipmunk as due to the fact 

 that at an early time the grizzly bear 

 scratched its back, this may be to the 

 mind of the Indian a perfectly rational- 

 istic explanation, while to us it would be 

 entirely mysterious. Thus it appears that 

 the general views of nature — the explana- 

 tions given for the occurrence of natural 

 phenomena — necessarily enter into a con- 

 sideration of the religions of primitive 

 tribes, even if these explanations should 

 be based on a purely rationalistic attitude 

 on the part of primitive man. The less 

 clear the line between observation and 

 reasoning on the one hand and imagina- 

 tion and inference due to emotional states 

 on the other, the less sharply drawn will 

 be the line between what may be called 

 science and religion. In accordance with 

 the definition given before, those concepts 

 that spring from the relation of the indi- 

 vidual to the outer world, and the form 

 of which depends on imagination and 

 emotion, may be said to form the tenets 

 of religion. 



When religious acts are considered in 

 greater detail, it appears that here also 

 acts prompted by rationalistic considera- 

 tions are not sharply separated from 

 others dictated by imagination and emo- 

 tion. Thus, when a medicine-man pur- 

 sues and captures the fleeing soul of a 

 sick man, he may follow out by his acts 

 in a rational way opinions based largely 

 on reasoning, although deeply affected in 

 their origin by such emotions as fear and 

 love. When, on the other hand, he tries 

 to gain greater efficiency by putting him- 

 self into a state of emotional excitement, 

 in which he believes his chances of suc- 

 cess are enhanced, his acts become reli- 

 gious, in the stricter sense of the term. 

 This lack of sharp division between ra- 

 tionalistic and religious forms of activity 

 is found everywhere. Furthermore, it 

 must be borne in mind that many actions 

 are performed without any conscious rea- 

 son, except so far as they are required by 

 custom. This is true particularly of ac- 

 tions that are considered as proper, like 

 those determined by rules regulating the 

 behavior of the young to the old, or of the 

 common people to the nobility; or also 

 of actions that are considered as ethical, 

 like those of hospitality and of pity. 

 Here the line of demarcation between re- 

 ligious activities and others not connected 

 with religion becomes even less sharp, 

 because it often happens that actions origi- 

 nally performed without any particular 

 reason or for purely rationalistic pur- 

 poses are secondarily given religious mo- 



tives. It thus follows that religious views 

 and actions are not i^rimarily connected 

 with ethical concepts. Only in so far as 

 man in his religious relations to the 

 outer world endeavors to follow certain 

 rules of conduct, in order to avoid evU 

 effects, is a relation between primitive re- 

 ligion and ethics established. 



The religious concepts of the Indians 

 may be described in two groups — those 

 that concern the individual, and those 

 that concern the social group, such as 

 tribe and clan. The fundamental concept 

 bearing on the religious life of the in- 

 dividual IS the belief in the existence of 

 magic power, which may influence the 

 life of man, and which in turn may be 

 influenced by human activity. In this 

 sense magic power must be understood 

 as the wonderful qualities which are be- 

 lieved to exist in objects, animals, men, 

 spirits, or deities, and which are superior 

 to the natural qualities of man. This 

 idea of magic power is one of the funda- 

 mental concepts that occur among all 

 Indian tribes. It is what is called manilo 

 by the Algonquian tribes; vnkanda, by 

 the Siouan tribes; orenda, by the Iroquois; 

 sulia, by the Salish; naimlak, by the Kwa- 

 kiutl, and tamanoas, by the Chinook. 

 Notwithstanding slight differences in the 

 signification of these terms, the funda- 

 mental notion of all of them is that of a 

 power inherent in the objects of nature 

 which is more potent than the natural 

 powers of man. This idea seems ade- 

 quately expressed by our term "wonder- 

 ful"; and it is hardly necessary to intro- 

 duce an Indian term, as has often been 

 attempted. Among the American terms, 

 the word maniio (q. v.; see also Orenda, 

 Otkon, Oijaron) has been most frequently 

 used to express this idea. The degree to 

 which the magic power of nature is in- 

 dividualized differs considerably among 

 various tribes. Although the belief in 

 the powers of inanimate objects is com- 

 mon, we find in America that, on the 

 whole, animals, particularly the larger 

 ones, are most frequently considered as 

 possessed of such magic power. Strong 

 anthropomorphic individualization also 

 occurs, which justifies us in calling these 

 powers deities. It seems probable that 

 among the majority of tribes, besides the 

 belief in the power of specific objects, a 

 belief in a magic power that is' only 

 vaguely localized, exists. In cases where 

 this belief is pronounced, the notion 

 sometimes approaches the concept of a 

 deity, or of a great spirit which is hardly 

 anthropomorphic in its character. This 

 is the case, for instance, among the Tsim- 

 shian of British Columbia and among the 

 Algonquian tribes of the Great Lakes, 

 and also in the figure of the Tirawa of 

 the Pawnee. 



As stated before, the whole concept of 



