THE SPRINGS OP CHAEACTER. 29 



Now in considering habit as a source of character we 

 tnnst be clear about one point. New acts, or the motives 

 that canse new acts, do not form a fresh part of character 

 imtil they become nnconscious. As long as an action is 

 performed each time by effort or from a conscious impulse, it 

 forms no part of the character ; because when the impulse 

 ■comes into consciousness, the mind has to consider Avhat it 

 will do, seeing the action is not yet natural to the individual. 

 The moment it becomes natural or, in other words, 

 sufficiently habitual, that new action, or that new prin- 

 ciple, begins to form an actual part of the character. 

 This is an important fact — that acts must sink, in their 

 motives, into unconsciousness, and be performed without 

 ■conscious effort before they express a part of the character 

 of the individual. This I will enlarge upon a little later. 

 Let me give an instance — I may tell the truth in a court of 

 law, or I may tell the truth under certain circumstances, with 

 imdeviating regularit}^, and yet 1 may not be a truthful 

 person habitually. A liar may on certain occasions speak 

 tiie truth when there is sufficient impulse or consciousness 

 present to prevent his telling his halDitual lies. It is only 

 when I tell the truth unconsciously and naturally that you 

 can call me a truthful person. Again, I may exercise great 

 -care in the pronunciation of French and speak it with the 

 utmost nicety, but that does not make me a careful person 

 or careful in doing other things — such for instance as riding a 

 bicycle. But if I am a careful person naturally I shall show 

 care all round — it comes unconsciously into play whenever 

 occasion arises. 



The third spring is the Will, and to this merit and direct 

 responsibility attach. Direct responsibility does not attach 

 to what 1 do unconsciously. Direct responsibility does not 

 attach to unconscious principles that I have inherited from 

 my parents. Merit, demerit, and direct responsibility attach 

 to the energising of these into actions by the will. This is 

 the direct work of the erjo. AVe must remember with regard 

 to will, that a strong will simply means a strong character ; 

 but not necessarily a good character, any more than a weak 

 ■character imj^lies bad morals. 



Now let us look a little closer, in what time we have at 

 our disposal, at these three intricate sprizigs of character. 



First — Heredity. In heredity we must remember that we 

 no longer believe that we inherit fixed qualities nearly so 

 inucb avS that heredity shows itself in tendency or potenti- 



