190 THE REV. J. H. BERNARD, D.D., ON THE 



from a higher stand-point. Now what does this involve ? 

 Just this : that the 1, the Ego, das Ich, who or which experi- 

 ences everything as in space or in time must itself be timeless 

 and spaceless. The consequence is inevitable. If we are 

 conscious of succession Ave ourselves do not change, we are 

 permanent. That which is conscious of any series of events 

 cannot itself be part of the series ; that which clamps the 

 series, so to speak, is not one of its links. And thus the 

 simplest act of experience is sufficient to lead us to the 

 recognition of that inexplicable mystery which we always 

 come to in our endeavours to explain anything completely. 

 First principles, from their very nature, are not susceptible of 

 proof; otherwise they would not be first principles. And so it 

 is impossible, if you will, to demonstrate the presence of the 

 Ego as a distinct factor in any act of consciousness simply 

 because that very demonstration would itself imply the Ego. 

 In the forcible language of the late Mr. Green: " The crown- 

 ing absurdity of speculation is the endeavour to explain the 

 genesis of thought. . . . To attempt to explain the in- 

 telligence by the intelligence is to cut the ground from under 

 your own feet." 



The conclusion, then, to which we are impelled by an 

 inexorable logic is that in order to give any intelligible account 

 not merely of the more complicated workings of nature, but 

 of the simplest act of consciousness, we must assume the 

 intelligence, mind, thought, — call it what we will — as an 

 ultimate mystery which baffles explanation and which lies 

 at its root. And therefore it is that materialism is not a 

 satisfactory solution of the problem before us, because it is 

 in truth a huge petitio jtriix-ijiii, a begging of the question. 



Having thus recognised the necessity of assuming what 

 we call mind as the basis of our own individual conscious 

 life, it is not hard to see why we attribute minds of like 

 nature to other men. We see that other men act as we do, 

 and that the most reasonable way of accounting for their 

 actions is by supposing that they have minds like ourselves, 

 that they are possessed of an active and spontaneously 

 energising faculty, which is the seat of their personality. 

 But it is instructive to remark that we cannot demonstrate 

 this; to cross the chasm which separates my personality 

 from your personality requires a venture of faith, just as 

 emphatically as any theological formula. I can by no means 

 prove that that complex of sensations which I constantly 

 experience and which I call the Prime Minister is anything 



